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INTERCEPTING AND DISCOURAGING
DOUBTFUL LITIGATION: A GOLDEN
ANNIVERSARY VIEW OF PLEADING,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND RULE
11 SANCTIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
MARTIN B. Louist

ProfessorLouis marks the 50th anniversaryof the FederalRules of
Civil Procedureby examining their nearfailure in the past decade and
recent efforts to revitalize them. He finds that a generation of liberal
judicial construction had given the FederalRules a strong proclaimant,
laissezfaire bias which left them unable to cope with a variety of abusive
litigative tactics or the flood of cases engulfing the federal courts. He
then examines recent reform efforts directed towards those devices in the
FederalRules like pleading,summary judgment, and rule 11 which are
designed to intercept and discourage the assertion of doubtful or meritless claims and defenses. He finds that the recentjudicialresucitationof
fact pleading will create many more problems than it solves, that the
judicial revitalization of the motion for summary judgment has generally been desirable, even though the courts have not yet explicated their
new approach, and that the implementation of amended rule 11 has
generally been successful. He concludes finally that these reforms have
probably not gone far enough, that the system is still vulnerable to the
tactical assertion of protractedclaims that are doubtful but not totally
without merit, and that in theforseeablefuture we shall have to consider
the adoption of even more extreme reform measures.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are now fifty years old.1 For much of
this time they were widely acclaimed "the best code of practice that is to be
'2
found anywhere in this country, or for that matter anywhere in this world."
Now that acclaim has turned to doubt.3 In recent years the federal courts have
t Paul B. Eaton Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. A.B.,
Princeton University, 1956; LL.B, 1959, LL.M, 1965, Harvard University. This article was prepared
with the assistance of a grant from the University of North Carolina Law Center.
1. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1-86, which were promulgated by the United States
Supreme Court by order of December 20, 1987, 302 U.S. 783, under the authority of the Enabling
Act, now 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982), became effective on September 16, 1988.
2. Parker, Book Review, 57 HARv. L. REV. 735, 736 (1944). See generally C. WRIGHT, THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 405-06 (4th ed. 1983) (citing to other praise of the Federal Rules).
3. See generally Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
ProcedureIn HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 911-12 (1987) (listing current critics
and criticism of the Federal Rules).
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been increasingly mired in congestion, delay, and high litigation costs, 4 problems
the Federal Rules have either partially caused or exacerbated 5 and with which7
6
at least until the amendments of 1983 -they were apparently unable to cope.
Indeed, by 1983 these problems had become severe enough to raise questions
about the viability of the federal civil justice system 8 and even the continuing
9
worth of the Federal Rules.
The Federal Rules have been so widely venerated and copied 0 that this
abrupt transition from apparent greatness to potential failure may appear shocking, but it is not without precedent. On the eve of its own golden anniversary
the Field Code,11 which preceded the Federal Rules as the dominant American
procedural system, 12 was likewise branded a failure t3 and of course was eventually replaced.
Perhaps the lesson to be learned is that the useful life of a procedural system is only half a century. Nevertheless, it is too soon to consider replacing the
14
Federal Rules or surrendering them to the mercies of contemporary tinkerers
4. The problems of the federal courts have been analyzed extensively. See generally Clark,
Adjudication to Administration: A StatisticalAnalysis of FederalDistrict Courts in the Twentieth
Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65 (1981) (a statistical analysis of the growth in filings and delay);
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We
Know) About OurAllegedly Contentiousand Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983) (questioning the thesis that America is an overly legalized, litigious society); Hufstedler, The Future of Civil
Litigation, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 753, 754, 756-59 (describing the sources and costs of court congestion and delay); Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 33-35
(1984) (attributing the system's problems to byzantine regulatory schemes, a procedural system oblivious to the social cost of litigation, cost allocation rules that encourage meritless advocacy, a
plethora of substantive rights, and a corps of eager attorneys).
5. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 433, 440-44 (1986) (listing the contributions of the Federal Rules to modern procedural problems); Miller, supra note 4, at 8 (the Federal Rules may be contributing to the protraction
of cases today).
6. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983). The highlight
of these amendments was the revitalization of rule 11. Other changes involved rule 7 (making it
clear that rule 11 applies to motions), rule 16 (substantial changes in the pretrial conference rules,
including a strengthened sanctions provision), and rule 26 (provisions limiting the frequency or extent of use of discovery methods and imposing rule 11 type signing requirements on discovery requests, responses, and objections).
7. See generallyA. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER REsPONSIBILITY

8 (1984) (describing need for amendments).
8. Kastenmeier & Remington, Court Reform and Access to Justice: A Legislative Perspective,
16 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 301, 303 (1979) ("the twin demons of cost and delay are asphyxiating our
courts, both state and federal, [with] pernicious effects on the quality of justice.").
9. Labaton, FederalCourt Rules Challenged After 50 Years, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1988, at B5,
col. 3; cf Subrin, supra note 3, at 1001-02.
10. Over half the states have adopted the Federal Rules in whole or substantial part. WRIGHT,
supra note 2, at 406.
11. Named after its draftsman, David Dudley Field, this Code of Civil Procedure was adopted
first by New York in 1848. An Act to simplify and abridge the Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings
of the Courts of this State, ch. 379, 1848 N.Y. Laws.
12. By 1900 27 states had adopted codes of civil procedure based in whole or substantial part
on the original Field Code. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 18 (3d ed. 1985).
13. The Code was roundly criticized by Roscoe Pound in 1906 in his famous address entitled
"The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice," 29 A.B.A. REPORTS
395 (1906).
14. The phrase is borrowed from former Chief Justice Warren Burger who himself borrowed it
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or discretionary trial level management. 15 Their defects still must be identified
precisely and possible cures must be considered. Indeed, the 1983 amendments
constituted just such an effort, 16 the success of which must be evaluated before
the underlying structure of the Rules is fundamentally altered or abandoned.
Moreover, because the Federal Rules constitute a mature procedural system in
harmony with our overall legal system, their eventual replacement doubtlessly
will be more evolutionary than revolutionary. Hence, a firm understanding of
what the Federal Rules have accomplished and why before 1983 they almost
failed would still be essential to any effort to replace them.

II.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

The Federal Rules focus primarily on events before trial1 7 and, in particular, on the structure of the pretrial system. 18 This system must accomplish four

basic tasks: (1) the provision of notice to the parties and the court of the asserted claims and defenses; (2) the ascertainment or discovery of the relevant-

facts; (3) the identification and narrowing of the issues for trial; and (4) the
interception before trial of substantively or factually meritless claims and de-

fenses. 19 For these tasks the Field Code had provided only two basic devices,
the pleadings and the demurrer. The pleadings gave notice and the demurrer

adequately intercepted substantively meritless claims and defenses. 20 Although
neither device was designed specifically to accomplish the remaining basic pre-

trial tasks, of necessity both were pressed into such service. Thus, the pleadings
were required to contain a detailed statement of the facts constituting the cause
of action or defense. 2' Those that failed to do so were demurrable; 22 those that
from Roscoe Pound. Burger, Agenda For2000 A.D.-A Need ForSystematic Anticipation, Keynote
Address of the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, St. Paul, Minn. (Apr. 7-9, 1976), reprinted in 70 F.R.D. 83 (1976).
15. Much has been written in recent years about the value and dangers of trial judges as case
managers. See generally Miller, supra note 4, at 19-22, 33-35 (arguing that more intense case management will improve the system's efficiency); Resnick, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376,.
426-31 (1982) (suggesting that pretrial case management taints judicial trial neutrality).
16. See supranote 6; see also Miller, supra note 4, at 12, 19, 23-24, 26 (comments by the principal author of these amendments on their purposes).
17. The Federal Rules made few changes in trial procedure. Their focus was on those areas of
civil procedure traditionally denominated pleading and parties, motions and amendments, all of
which deal primarily with events before trial. Not surprisingly these areas of change are also the
ones blamed for the failures of the Federal Rules. Miller, supra note 4, at 8-9 (blaming notice pleading, inadequate interception through motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and the "quicksand" of discovery).
18. This system, which processes all cases, has two principal functions: to identify and dispose
of cases that lack disputed questions of fact and can be resolved as a matter of law on motion
(sometimes hereafter referred to as the interception function), and to prepare the remaining cases,
which contain disputed questions of fact and apparently require a trial, for a quality trial on the
merits.
19. C. WRIGHT, supranote 2, at 438 (assigning these same four functions to "pleadings," which
together with the demurrer once constituted most of the pretrial system). The first three tasks together make up what I have called the second basic function of the pretrial system, see note 18 supra,
preparing a case for a quality trial on the merits.
20. This was the familiar process of demurring for failure to state a cause of action or defense.
See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.22 (1985) [hereinafter J. FRIEDENTHAL].
21. J. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 20, § 5.5.
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did perforce strictly limited the proof which could be offered at trial.2 3 In this
way the pleadings and the demurrer together helped to ascertain the facts, to
define the issues for trial, and to intercept factually meritless claims and
24
defenses.
Code jurisdictions cannot be faulted for making do in this way with the
devices available to them or for adopting certain technical requirements as the
necessary means, 25 but often they lost sight of the ends sought and rigidly enforced the required means almost for their own sake.26 The net result was a
flawed pretrial scheme that unfairly required pleaders to ascertain and set forth
the relevant facts fully and accurately at the beginning of the action, 27 ordinarily
without the benefit of discovery or a liberal amendment policy. 28 As a result the
demurrer was turned into a nasty, wasteful, and occasionally unjust tactical
weapon. 29 Although some of the demurrer's victims doubtlessly had been lazy
22. E.g., Gillespie v. Goodyear Serv. Stores, 258 N.C. 487, 128 S.E.2d 762 (1963) (sustaining
demurrer to factually deficient, conclusory complaint).
23. Evidence offered by a party that is at variance with the allegations in that party's pleadings
is not admissible. F. JAMES & J. HAZARD, supra note 12, § 4.14. In this way the pleadings define
the issues for trial, id. § 4.12, unless leave to amend is given. In many Code jurisdictions, however,
attempts to prove unpleaded causes of action or defenses were regarded as "fatal" variances that
could not be cured by amendment. J. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 20, § 5.26, at 304.
24. Code courts would ordinarily give leave to amend after sustaining a demurrer to a factually
deficient complaint. J. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 20, § 5.22, at 295. If the missing allegations were
not supplied, the complaint would be dismissed, unless leave to amend were again given. E.g., Gautier v. General Tel. Co., 234 Cal. App. 2d 302, 310, 44 Cal. Rptr. 404, 409 (1965) (upholding dismissal of fourth amended complaint since plaintiff apparently could not state a valid cause of action). If
the missing facts are not supplied because they are untrue or unprovable, then the demurrer is being
employed, albeit indirectly, to intercept factually deficient claims and defenses. See Louis, Federal
Summary Judgment Doctrine: A CriticalAnalysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745, 746 (1974) ( The "implicit
assumption" behind the demurrer was that "the claimant could not prove what he did not allege and
would not allege, ordinarily under oath, what he could not prove.").
25. Code pleading requirements ideally should have been stated in functional terms, for example with sufficient factual detail to show prima facie the existence of the claim or defense asserted.
Lawyers, however, seem to prefer verbal formulas to functional statements. Hence, Code states
adopted the infamous requirement that pleaders set forth the "ultimate facts," rather than "conclusions of law" or "evidentiary facts." J. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 20, § 5.5.
26. Like most other verbal distinctions, the differences among conclusions of law, ultimate
facts, and evidentiary facts were not clear-cut, but were simply matters of degree. Cook, Statements
ofFact In Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. RaV. 416, 416-19 (1921). Consequently, courts
ought to have applied these distinctions in terms of the ends sought. Id. at 422 (such questions
cannot "be settled by mere logic, but according to notions of fairness and convenience"). Instead
they attempted the impossible, a precise verbal demarcation for every element of every claim and
defense. The net result was confusion, delay, disagreement, waste, and injustice. J. FRIEDENTHAL,
supra note 20, § 5.5.
27. Despite the alleged prohibition against the pleading of evidentiary facts, some Code courts
clearly admitted that what they had in mind was a high level of factual specificity in pleading. E.g.,
Gillespie v. Goodyear Serv. Stores, 258 N.C. 487, 490, 128 S.E. 2d 762, 766 (1963) (noting the
complaint's failure to allege "what occurred, when it occurred, where it occurred, who did what").
Commentators have noted that the Code's verbal distinctions tended to obscure the real issue, the
level of factual detail required in pleading. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 12, §§ 3.7, 3.8.
28. Code appellate courts rarely found an abuse of discretion in a trial judge's denial of leave to
amend, see Louis, Survey of North Carolina Case Law Civil Procedure (Pleadingand Parties), 45
N.C.L. REV. 823, 836 (1967) (asserting that no such case could be found in the North Carolina
reports), did not recognize the doctrine of implied consent, see FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b), allowed belated challenges to variances, Louis, supra, at 825 n. 10, and often would not allow either amendment
at trial or relation back if the amendment changed the cause of action, C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING
730 (2d ed. 1947).
29. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 20, § 5.5; Louis, supra note 28, at 826-27.
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or careless, 30 others lacked equal access to the evidence or for some other reason
could not obtain all the necessary facts without discovery. Most of the demurrer's victims also were claimants, 3 1 who understandably and perhaps rightfully
came to regard the system as biased against them and as favoring those defendants able to hide evidence of their own wrongdoing.
To meet these problems, the Federal Rules provided three new pretrial devices, discovery, summary judgment, and the pretrial conference, each of which
was specifically designed to discharge one of the pretrial tasks for which the
Code had been inadequate. Thus, discovery was designed to deal directly with
fact ascertainment, the pretrial conference with issue formulation, and summary
judgment with the interception of factually deficient claims and defenses. 32 Because of the presence of these specialized devices, the Federal Rules were also
33
able to eliminate or relax many of the Field Code's technical requirements.
Thus, pleading 34 and amendment 35 rules were relaxed, interception before discovery was limited primarily to substantive defects, 36 and material variances between pleadings and proof no longer were automatically or even ordinarily
37
fatal.
These changes alone might have been enough, but together they pointed in
a new direction and towards a realignment of the pretrial system. The pleading
stage thus was deemphasized and became basically an unsupervised exchange of
notice-providing papers among the parties. Substantive interception was still
possible at this stage, but factual interception was shifted back to the new devices of discovery and summary judgment. 38 The courts still had no direct re30. The Federal Rules, say some critics, pander to the lazy and careless attorney. McCaskill,
The Modern Philosophy of Pleading: A Dialogue Outside the Shades, 38 A.B.A. J. 123, 125 (1952).
Other critics ask why the clients of these attorneys should be punished for, or why the system should
expend so much effort correcting, such technical errors. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 445. Still
others note the general difficulty of obtaining and pleading all the facts at the start of litigation. F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 12, § 3.13, at 159.
31. Fact pleading requirements apply to both plaintiffs and defendants. Nevertheless, as the
history of both Code pleading and notice pleading shows, invariably the majority of the cases, and
the most famous or notorious of them, involved challenges to complaints. E.g., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944) (notorious decision rejecting a motion to dismiss a poorly pleaded
complaint); Gillespie v. Goodyear Serv. Stores, 258 N.C. 487, 128 S.E.2d 762 (1963) (a frequently
cited Code opinion sustaining a demurrer to plaintiff's conclusory allegations of an assault). Perhaps there is some truth to the notion that all questions of pleading and interception invariably turn
on whether the system is inclined to indulge plaintiffs alleging wrongs or to protect defendants and
the system from doubtful claims. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 5, at 445-46 (suggesting that whereas
the lax requirements of the Federal Rules favored plaintiffs, specificity requirements inherently favor
defendants). Ultimately this perspective reduces procedure to a question of the degree to which the
civil justice system permits the weak and powerless to redress alleged wrongs and redistribute the
wealth of the nation. At this point, however, analysis ends and shouting begins.
32. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 439.
33. See supra notes 25, 28.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (defining the relaxed
"notice" pleading requirements of rule 8(a)).
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 15.
36. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46 (1957) (dismissal on pleadings limited primarily to substantive
inability to state a claim for relief); C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 442.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b); C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 442-43.
38. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2555 (1986) (under notice pleading, motion for
summary judgment replaces motion to dismiss as device to intercept factually deficient claims and
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sponsibility for the progress or success of the pretrial stage. 3 9 The only
exception was the optional pretrial conference, but it was to take place at the
40
close of the pretrial period and was to focus primarily on the forthcoming trial.
These changes in the pretrial system reflected a new procedural outlook:
any claim or defense asserted in good faith was presumptively entitled to a trial
on the merits unless and until its insufficiency was clearly established. 4' This
new outlook, which appeared to be a welcome movement away from the anticlaimant bias of the Field Code, 42 soon so dominated the judiciary's view of the
new procedural system 43 that it often obliterated the Field Code's countervailing
concerns for judicial efficiency and fairness to opposing parties. The end result
was a system that by 1983 was as biased in one direction as the Code had been in
the other 44 -a system so indulgent of dubious claims, defenses, and behavior
defenses); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976) (in cases of unequal
access to the evidence fact interception ordinarily should not occur until after discovery), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 890 (1983).
39. See Miller,supra note 4, at 15 (the assumption of a self-executing cooperative pretrial phase
was "somewhat naive").
40. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 601-02.
41. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 445; Marcus, supra note 5, at 439, 441 (the Federal Rules
embody a "pro-plaintiff," "liberal ethos" in which "the preferred disposition is on the merits, by jury
trial, after full disclosure through discovery").
42. See supra note 31.
43. E.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966) ("bona fide complaints
[should] be carried to an adjudication on the merits").
44. Some of the one-sided rules developed by the federal courts to protect the merits are discussed below, one being the infamous statement that a complaint cannot be dismissed unless "it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). This statement, if taken literally,
would foolishly protect from challenge complaints alleging only that defendant wronged plaintiff or
owes plaintiff a certain sum. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 12, at 153. Although the statement makes sense only as a guide to granting leave to amend, it is cited endlessly as a guide to
whether a complaint states a claim for relief, and serves, along with other similar, strongly worded
statements, e.g., Cook & Nichol, Inc. v. Plimsoll Club, 451 F.2d 505, 506 n.2 (5th Cir. 1971) (suggesting that dismissals of complaints for inadequate pleading have "a high mortality rate"), to create
a strong presumption against the grant of a motion to dismiss for any reason other than substantive
insufficiency. Another developed rule is the rule that leave to amend must ordinarily be granted and
that its denial, without giving a reason, is a presumptive abuse of discretion. Foman v. Davis, 371
U.S. 178, 182 (1962). A third is the strict construction of rule 12(e), as amended, which barred most
attempts to make vague, conclusory pleadings more definite and certain. E.g., Hodgson v. Virginia
Baptist Hosp., Inc., 482 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1973). The strict, unsympathetic construction and general failure to enforce the original version of rule I1 is yet another rule protecting the merits. See
generally Risinger, Honesty in Pleadingand Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems vith FederalRule of CivilProcedure11, 61 MINN. L. REv. 1, 5, 15-16, 42-52 (1976) (concluding that original
rule 11 was rarely enforced, was replete with textual ambiguities and deficiencies and was not construed sympathetically by courts). For many years the judiciary was disinclined to grant serious
sanctions for discovery abuses absent a showing of wilfulness. See Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre
Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1979) (finally extending the "willfulness" requirement to cases of "gross professional negligence"). Courts were also generally reluctant
to limit broad, repetitive, or disproportionate discovery, culminating in some questionable proposals
by the American Bar Association to limit the scope of discovery, and eventually in the 1983 amendments to rule 26(b)(1). See generally Advisory Committee Note, 1983 Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 217-18 (1983); Schroeder & Frank, The ProposedChanges
in the Discovery Rules, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 475 (opposing the proposed redefinition of the scope of
discovery). Judges' long-standing judicial reluctance to grant summary judgment against claimants
also contributed to the one-sidedness of the system. Louis, supra note 24, at 752 (arguing that
artificial restrictions upon the use of summary judgment against claimants were foolish and unnecessary and would eventually have to be abandoned); Louis, Summary Judgment and the Actual Malice
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that it fell prey to adversarial ethics, crowded dockets, rising litigation costs,
abusive discovery, and holdup litigation.
III.

THE EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL RULES ON MODERN LITIGATION

The procedural woes of our civil justice system are easy enough to list. The
federal courts are currently bursting with cases, claims, and defenses, 45 many of
which are apparently not well founded but cannot be intercepted easily before
trial; the cost and demands of litigation, and of discovery in particular, have
grown dramatically and have become significant tactical weapons;46 modem
joinder provisions, perhaps the next b8te noire of the system, have turned some
cases into bloated soap operas with endless plots and characters; 47 and delays of
every kind, particularly in reaching trial, are common and lengthy. 48 As a result
of these problems, and regardless of the accuracy or fairness with which the
merits of cases ultimately are resolved, courts are increasingly regarded as forums of last resort to which only those without other alternatives willingly
turn. 49 Indeed, it may now be an accurate generalization to say that those who
litigate have lost and that those who triumph in litigation have merely lost less.
Not surprisingly, as the process of litigation has become less and less satisfactory, interest in alternative methods of dispute resolution has grown apace.
Although the Federal Rules are not directly responsible for the present
flood of federal cases, they clearly have not efficiently contained, managed, or
discouraged this deluge. This is hardly surprising. As interpreted, the Federal
Rules until recently provided a cautious, indulgent system of civil procedure
heavily biased against the early interception of doubtful claims and defenses or
the punishment of those who abused the system in any way.50 Such a system is
inherently unable to cope with an overload of cases, particularly if an increasingly cost-conscious society is not prepared to foot the bill. Indeed, if the Federal Rules represented the culmination of an historical quest for access to justice
and the merits, then arguably the quest of the next century will be to determine
Controversy in ConstitutionalDefamation Cases, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 707, 708-10 (1984) (asserting
that some courts were opposed to prevailing case law restrictions on the use of summary judgment
against claimants and were searching for ways around them).
45. In the decade of the 1970s, for example, federal district court filings doubled and trials
lasting over 30 days tripled. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in
Guiding a Casefrom Filingto Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 770, 770 (1981).
46. See, eg., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (referring to
the "widespread abuse of discovery that has become a prime cause of delay and expense in civil
litigation"); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) (liberal discovery
gives plaintiff "an in terrorem increment of the settlement value").
47. The rise and fall of the "spurious" or rule 23(b)(3) class action is one example. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 470-87 (discussion of a class action suit and the controversy over
rule 23). Another is the complicated litigation involving all the-parties to a failed construction project. Eg., Amco Constr. Co. v. Mississippi State Bldg. Comm'n, 602 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1979); Lasa
Per L'Industria Del Marmo Societa Per Azione v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1969).
48. See generally Miller, supra note 4, at 1-2 (decrying the delay in present day litigation).
49. Miller, supra note 4, at 2 (the cost and delay of modem litigation "chills the enthusiasm and
debilitates the resolve" to litigate legitimate grievances).
50. See supra note 44.
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how much less than that society realistically can afford.51
To understand in precise terms how the Federal Rules have contributed to

these problems, a simple example may be helpful. Assume that a large manufacturing corporation suddenly terminates a distributor that reasonably suspects,

but cannot prove, that the reason for the termination is joint complaints and
pressure from other distributors with which it competes aggressively in price.

The terminated distributor files a private antitrust action alleging in general
terms a conspiracy between its competitors and the manufacturer to eliminate its
aggressive price competition. Such general allegations would almost automatically survive a motion to dismiss 52 and allow plaintiff to undertake discovery,
which in antitrust cases is usually voluminous and expensive. Furthermore,
even if the plaintiff could not obtain prima facie proof of the alleged conspiracy

through discovery, until recently it often was still able to escape summary judgement and get to trial.5 3 Hence, defendants' first real opportunity to intercept
this potentially nonexistent or unprovable claim would be at trial on a motion

for directed verdict or after trial and an adverse jury verdict on a motion for

54
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Obviously a fair system cannot ruthlessly dispatch before discovery, or
sometimes even before trial, every claim that is difficult to prove. Otherwise

those who lack equal access to the evidence often would be denied their day in
court.55 At some point, however-and there is a growing consensus that the

Federal Rules as interpreted before 1983 went well beyond this point 6-the

refusal to dismiss such claims is unfair to defendants and the system.5 7 For
51. See Miller, supra note 4, at 12.
52. The recent decisions in Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988),
and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), have made it much more difficult
for terminated dealers to allege and prove a vertical price fixing conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act, particularly when only a single rival dealer complains to or otherwise pressures the manufacturer to terminate its price cutting rival. To avoid some of these current substantive difficulties,
this example posits the existence of several complaining rival dealers, whose joint efforts arguably
still could constitute a per se unlawful horizontal conspiracy.
53. In Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962), the Supreme Court
stated that "summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation when motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and
hostile witnesses thicken the plot." For many years this language dominated and seemed to limit the
use of summary judgment in antitrust litigation. Louis, supra note 24, at 765. In the past decade,
however, federal courts have increasingly ignored Poller and granted summary judgment in antitrust
cases. Louis, supra note 44, at 710 n.21, 721. The recent decision in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986), which granted summary judgment against plaintiff in an
antitrust case without the usual obeisance to Poller,seems to approve the current trend.
54. Unless the insufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence is clear, trial judges normally will deny or
reserve decision on a motion for directed verdict in the hope the jury will find for the defendant and
eliminate the problem. If the jury finds for the plaintiff, its verdict still may be overturned on a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 628-29. For these
reasons the motion for directed verdict is not often used, and a plaintiff able to reach trial ordinarily
may include the costs of a full trial in his settlement calculations.
55. I have suggested previously that such a plaintiff should not be permitted to reach trial
unless she has, at the minimum, evidence approaching a prima facie case and demonstrably reasonable prospects for obtaining the balance at trial. Louis, supra note 24, at 769; Louis, supra note 44,
at 719.
56. Louis, supra note 44, at 709-10.
57. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 447 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (rule 56 must be construed with due
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example, until recently a plaintiff with a groundless or unprovable claim that
would probably fail at trial could too easily hold up the defendant for a substantial settlement reflecting the high price of discovery and trial.5 8 Summary judgment is supposed to prevent such holdups, but ordinarily its consideration must
await the completion of discovery 59 and until recently the motion often was
routinely denied. 60 As a result, the pretrial system in effect before 1983 not only
failed to intercept doubtful claims, but it may have inadvertently invited their
61
initial assertion.
Plaintiffs of course have not been the only parties who abused the system in
these ways. Defendants have often responded in kind with an array of questionable motions, defenses, and claims 62 of their own, sometimes simply to cause
confusion and wear down the opposition. 63 Indeed, before 1983 both sides
tended to throw into the litigation almost every conceivable claim and defense. 64
Such tactics obviously did not make for efficient judicial administration, but until the amendments to rule 11 the courts were extremely, perhaps even shamefully, slow to throw out such dross or to sanction those who proffered it. 65 The
courts were similarly hesitant until recently to limit discovery or to sanction
those who abused that process. 6 6 As a result the pretrial system sometimes became an uncontrolled, expensive, adversarial free-for-all.
The specific contributions of the Federal Rules to these problems as they
existed before 1983 can now be identified precisely. First, by eliminating fact
interception at the pleading stage,67 the Rules permitted most doubtful claims
regard not only for the rights of those asserting claims and defenses but also for the rights of persons
opposing such claims and defenses).
58. Louis, supra note 44, at 717-18; Miller, supra note 4, at 11; see note 46 supra.
59. See supra note 38.
60. Louis, supra note 24, at 761 (describing and rejecting the "slightest doubt" approach to
summary judgment once followed by some federal courts); Pielemeier, Summary Judgment in Minnesota: A Searchfor Patterns,7 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 147, 149-50 (1981) (survey showing that
the motion generally is useless in Minnesota and that some trial judges deny such motions as a
matter of course).
61. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems In the
Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L. REv. 1313, 1316 (1986) (suggesting
that lack of effective judicial oversight and tactical considerations in litigation had clogged the courts
with frivolous suits and unnecessary pretrial activity).
62. For many years, for example, answers to complaints filed by large businesses routinely
would include an antitrust counterclaim. Indeed opposition to proposals to permit removal of actions if a defendant pleaded a defense or counterclaim arising under federal law was based in part on
the fear that in this manner defendants could readily plead their way into federal court. See generally Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, Part II, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268,
270-76 (1969) (evaluating such a removal proposal).
63. Although amended rule 11 applies to both plaintiffs and defendants, it has been applied far
more often to the former. Nelken, supra note 61, at 1327. Consequently, defendants still may be
able to indulge in such excesses of pleading and motion making without substantial fear of retribution under rule 1I.
64. See Miller, supra note 4, at 15 n.49, 17 (asserting that the pretrial system has been afflicted
by "gamesmanship, harassment .... evasion, delay, and spiralling costs").
65. Nelken, supra note 61, at 1316 (suggesting it was less the original textual deficiencies of rule
Il-see note 44 supra-than prevalent ideas about the propriety of sanctions against lawyers that
caused courts to ignore the rule for so long).
66. Miller, supra note 4, at 17, 19, 22, 24; see supra note 46.
67. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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and defenses to reach the expensive discovery stage with its attendant holdup
potential. Second, the discovery rules were subject to a variety of abuses
designed to inflate costs, wear down opponents, and induce settlement. 68 Third,
judicial reluctance to grant summary judgment except in the clearest cases allowed many doubtful claims and defenses to reach trial and further enlarged
their holdup potential. 69 Fourth, as a result of these difficulties and the failure
to enforce the truth-in-pleading requirements of rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 70 the initial assertion of spurious claims and defenses was countenanced and perhaps even encouraged. Finally, the inability or failure of trial
judges to take pretrial control of cases resulted in additional cost, confusion,
71
delay, and tactical abuse.
It is both ironic and sobering to note that most of these problems grew out
of those "improvements" in federal pretrial procedure that were designed to
cure the Code's deficiencies. 72 For example, the de-emphasis of pleading and
the postponement of fact interception until after discovery were designed to
deny defendants the tactical use of the demurrer 73 and to provide pleaders with
a reasonable opportunity to obtain proof of their contentions before confronting
a challenge on the merits. These fundamental changes were necessary and desirable, but in combination with rigid supplemental judicial rules designed to protect the merits even further, 74 they made possible until recently the new,
burdensome problems and tactics that threatened the viability of the present
system. The experience has at least taught us some very hard but important
lessons. We have learned that attorneys-if not all of them, then certainly
enough of them-will ruthlessly exploit any imbalance in the procedural system,
whether it is the propleader bias of the Federal Rules or the antipleader bias of
the Code, and that their sense of professional responsibility and collegial interdependence alone cannot restrain them sufficiently. 75 We have also learned that
the judiciary, whose decisional power to fine tune the system arguably makes it
68. See supra note 46. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41
(1975), the Court noted that "the liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" give a plaintiff "an in terrorem increment of the settlement value," so that "even a complaint
which by objective standards may have very little chance of success at trial has a settlement value to
the plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect of success at trial so long as he may prevent the suit
from being resolved against him by dismissal or summary judgment."
69. See supra notes 44, 53, 60, 68.
70. See supra note 44.
71. See supra authorities cited in note 15.
72. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. To some this irony of cause and effect is
quite predictable. Judith Resnik has written that the "history of procedure is a series of attempts to
solve the problems created by the preceding generation's procedural reforms." Resnik, Tiers, 57 S.
CAL. L. REv. 837, 1030 (1984).
73. See supra notes 20-27.
74. See supra note 44.
75. Arthur Miller suggests that attorney misbehavior of this kind is attributable to the attorney's desire to do the best for a client, the effort to harass opponents and drive up their costs, the low
cost use of form interrogatories and word processor generated paper, the profitability of raising
billable hours, and the current identification of the attorney far more as a hired gun than as an officer
of the court. Miller, supra note 4, at 17-19. One obvious answer to this problem is rule 11 and
equivalent sanction provisions. Another is the elimination of one-sided rules and interpretations that
invite tactical exploitation by attorneys.
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our first line of defense against emerging procedural problems, may not only be
76
slow to deal with such problems, but may actually cause or contribute to them.
Finally, we have learned that the cost of providing the fullest measure of support
and protection to the merits is prohibitively high, 77 that some portion of this
ideal must be sacrificed on the altars of efficiency, affordability, and fairness to
the opposing party and the judicial system, and that proposed procedural
changes involving such incursions upon the merits are no longer ipso facto unthinkable. We also know in general what must be done to rebalance the system.
We must intercept before trial more meritless or unprovable claims and defenses
and find appropriate ways to discourage or sanction their assertion. We must
find ways to control the scope and amount of discovery and to limit its abuse.
Finally, we must manage the entire pretrial process more efficiently.
Despite the attention these three tasks have already received in the literature and in the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,7 8 an
extended analysis of all of them is too substantial a project for the remainder of
this study. Consequently, the remainder will consider only the first of these
tasks, the interception and discouragement of factually meritless litigation. The
discussion will begin with a general examination of the three principal interception/discouragement mechanisms of the Federal Rules, will then consider the
general problem of reforming these mechanisms, and finally will examine each in
detail.
IV.

REFORMING THE PRETRIAL INTERCEPTION/DISCOURAGEMENT SYSTEM
OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

A. In General
The Federal Rules employ three basic pretrial interception/discouragement
mechanisms: prediscovery interception at the pleading stage, principally
through the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief,79 postdiscovery interception through the motion for summary judgment, and sanctions
for violation of the truth-in-signing requirements of rule 11. Until recently these
mechanisms were substantially underemployed. The motion to dismiss was limited primarily to substantive defects80 and performed virtually no factual inter76. See supra notes 25-30, 44 and accompanying text for explication of the contention that onesided judicial interpretations of both the Code and the Federal Rules were principal causes of the
problems these systems encountered and their inability to deal with them.
77. See Miller, supra note 4, at 8-9.
78. See supra note 6.
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion for judgment on the pleadings, FED. R. Civ. P.
12(c), and the motion to strike an insufficient defense, FED. R. Civ. P. 12(f), serve equivalent functions, the interception of substantively insufficient claims and defenses.
80. Basically there are two kinds of substantive defects: a claim or defense based upon a meritless or unrecognized legal theory, and a claim or defense that admits on its face, either absolutely or
sometimes prima facie, the existence of a defense or avoidance thereto or the nonexistence of an
essential element thereof. To illustrate the second defect, a complaint which alleges that plaintiff was
exercising due care while traveling down the highway at 100 miles per hour may either admit the
affirmative defense of contributory negligence or the nonexistence of the essential element of due
care.
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ception function;8 ' summary judgment was employed so sparingly and

grudgingly that often it was regarded as essentially unavailable;8 2 and rule 11
sanctions were almost never imposed.8 3 Rule 11 suffered from textual deficiencies that the courts were reluctant to overcome by interpretation.8 4 By contrast
rules 12(b)(6) and 56 have been general, open-ended provisions that were susceptible to almost any reasonable interpretation but that until recently were construed very narrowly-some would say, were emasculated-as part of the
preserve-the-merits philosophy of the federal courts.8 5
It appears then that through narrow or restrictive interpretations adopted
before 1983 the federal courts caused or contributed to the breakdown of the
interception/discouragement mechanisms of the Federal Rules and then failed

to respond decisively to the emerging crisis. A century before, other courts had
similarly fiddled while the Field Code burned.8 6 In both situations a triumphant, extreme philosophy of civil procedure-first, the anticlaimant bias of the
Code and then, in obvious overreaction thereto, the save-the-merits extremism

of the Federal Rules-had been the motivating force. If form holds, today's
procedural reform efforts will soon be engulfed by a resurgent anticlaimant bias
fueled by a desire to make the judicial system efficient and claimants accountable.8 7 This century of imbalance and failure raises some difficult questions.
81. Such motions, which challenge only the face of a pleading, serve a factual interception
function indirectly if it is assumed that the pleader is unable to allege in good faith whatever necessary facts have been omitted. See supra note 24. Needless to say, this assumption is not always
correct. That is not a sufficient reason never to dismiss a factually deficient claim, however. Leave
to amend could still be given and in appropriate cases discovery could be permitted before dismissal
was ordered. The problem, as experience under the Code illustrated, is to identify those omissions
warranting dismissal without generally inviting tactical use of the motion to dismiss-in situations,
at least, not now effectively covered by rule 11 sanctions. In half a century of trying, the federal
courts have not done very well here. Concepts like notice pleading or liberal construction merely
identify a mood. The infamous and unreliable Conley rule, see supra note 44, though often cited, is
just as often violated, particularly in civil rights cases. See infra note 99. Comparisons with the
forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are useful, but courts have never attempted to explain
what is common to these forms, even though that seems to be obvious. Each of the forms contains
sufficient detail to identify the transaction or occurrence complained of and the legal theory relied
upon. Clearly most complaints satisfy this minimal requirement, including the infamous one sustained in Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944) (pro se complaint in broken English
still sufficiently indentified the transaction complained of and the legal theory). Of course a complaint satisfying this minimal requirement could still omit an essential element of the claim. That
need not be a ground for dismissal, however, except perhaps where the element is crucial to the
claim's existence and is not implicit in or readily inferred from the facts alleged. Cf O'Brien v.
DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 n.3 (1st Cir. 1976) (a complaint will not be dismissed for omitting facts
in support of its arcane elements, but the omission of facts that would dominate the case justifies the
assumption that they do not exist), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). But see Garcia v. Hilton
Hotels Int'l, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 5 (D.P.R.1951) (refusing to dismiss a defamation complaint failing to
allege publication).
82. See supra notes 44, 53, 60.
83. Nelken, supra note 61, at 1315; Risinger, supra note 44, at 34-37.
84. Risinger, supra note 44, at 5, 15-16, 42-52.
85. See supra note 44.
86. Marcus, supra note 5, at 438 (attributing the Code's failure in part to "judicial sabotage").
87. See Resnik, supra note 72, at 1030 (suggesting that today's procedural efforts usually are
directed at solving the problems caused by yesterday's reforms). One who searches for evidence of
backlash can perhaps readily find it. Nevertheless, in today's strident calls to correct the abuses of
the Federal Rules, see supra notes 44, 46, 68, one sees the seeds of backlash in the federal courts'
current, occasional reemployment of fact pleading, seemingly unaware of its historical difficulties,
Marcus, supra note 5, at 444-51 (describing the revival of fact pleading in the federal courts), and in
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Why do our attitudes towards civil procedure, as well as our procedural systems,
lurch from one extreme to another in apparent rejection of some theoretical
golden mean? Why are the judges, supposedly the best of our profession, so
susceptible to its momentary passions and biases 88 and so unable to make
midcourse corrections when the evidence of disaster is all about them? Perhaps
appellate courts are guilty of employing reversals and overly strong language to
induce change 89 and then of ignoring the one-sided results a cowed trial bench
dutifully produces. 90 Perhaps trial judges are too fearful of reversal to deal with
emerging procedural problems and too inclined to pass the buck to appellate
courts when new problems arise and precedent must be distinguished.
Despite these problems, the reformation of the interception/discouragement systems of the Federal Rules appears to be within reach. Rule 11 has
already been successfully amended, 9 1 and courts today are much more inclined
to grant motions to dismiss 92 and for summary judgment. 93 The doctrine that
their haste to employ the motion for summary judgment, even in state of mind cases, with no recognition of why they formerly moved cautiously, Louis, supra note 44, at 710-12 (describing the forceful use of summary judgment in constitutional defamation cases with little concern for the state of
mind issues present therein), one sees the first signs of backlash. See generally Risinger, Another
Step In The Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment On The Supreme Court's New Approach To
Summary Judgment, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 35, 35-36 (1988) (suggesting that federal civil procedure is presently undergoing an antiplaintiff counterrevolution).
88. The Federal Rules, liberally interpreted, enjoyed wide support for many years throughout
the legal profession. The federal judges, therefore, can hardly be accused of leading the profession by
the nose or down the garden path. Nevertheless, the judiciary is responsible for extending the general philosophy of the Federal Rules even further through interpretation, see note 44 supra, and then
reacting too slowly, if at all, to the crisis these interpretations helped to cause. Moreover, the judiciary also sometimes seems to take its cues from the election returns or the prevailing ethos of the
community. A decade ago, for example, federal judges seemingly could find no end to the liberal
ethos of the Federal Rules or, for that matter, the antitrust laws; today these judges are quick to spot
procedural limits, see, e.g., Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986) (finding limits on relation back
of amendments under FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)), and seem unable to find an antitrust violation anywhere. Compare Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967) (asserting a very
lenient view of claims of predatory pricing) with Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986) (asserting almost a presumption against a finding of predatory pricing). A
change in approach to both bodies of law was probably necessary and inevitable. The degree of
change and its rapid, general acceptance by the federal judges is surprising, however, and suggest
that judicial attitudes towards these fields of law, and perhaps some others, are not independently
formulated but to a large extent simply mirror the intellectual fashion of the time.
89. The United States Supreme Court hears so many constitutional cases that it has limited
time for other federal questions, which can be heard only sporadically and often only in response to
some perceived difficulty in the area. See, e.g., Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm JurisdictionFinally
Exceeds Its Reach: A Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v.
Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. REV. 407, 408-09 (1980) (noting that the Court had not decided a long-arm
jurisdiction case in twenty years and then, in response to the perception that the states were exceeding the limits of due process, had suddenly granted certiorari in a number of cases). Consequently,
to deal quickly and decisively with a perceived problem, the Court might naturally employ overly
strong language. Such strong arm tactics, however, could stampede the lower courts in the opposite
direction.
90. Ultimately a balanced system requires judges who understand when the limits of a rule have
been reached and who are not afraid to say so, even if it requires that higher court opinions be
explained, qualified, or distinguished. That is what finally occurred in the area of summary judgment, even though it arguably took far too long. See supra note 53. Elsewhere it took so long that
the Code failed and the Federal Rules almost followed suit.
91. See the evaluation of current practice under amended rule I1 in Part IV.D. infra.
92. Marcus, supra note 5, at 444-51 (describing areas in which federal courts are again dismissing factually deficient complaints).
93. See supra note 53.
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formerly restricted the use of these motions already is being replaced or softened. This new, more balanced doctrine, however, often amounts to little more
than a set of new, countervailing cliches from which the judges may pick and
choose. 94 Such flexibility, which amounts to a discretionary license or its functional equivalent, 95 is sometimes desirable, 96 but here it involves judicial power
to resolve the merits. 97 Without more appellate guidance and supervision, it
could lead to ad hoc, unjust dismissals, as well as to the possibility of judicial
overcorrection and backlash. 98 Indeed, many recent opinions granting motions
to dismiss or for summary judgment are dangerously slanted in the direction of
aggressive interception, ignore or fail to mention the countervailing considera-

tions that formerly commanded the opposite result, and in some cases are alarmingly redolent of supposedly repudiated Code rhetoric. 99 For these reasons
balanced, but unexplicated, doctrine that fails to educate or control lower court
94. For example, the Poller rule, see supra note 53, that summary judgment should be used
sparingly in antitrust cases because issues of intent are usually involved and access to the evidence is
often unequal, has been limited by countervailing reminders of the cost of antitrust litigation and the
temptations of the treble damage remedy. See, e.g., Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d
1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979). See generally S. Calkins, Summary
Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust
System, 74 GEO. L. REV. 1065, 1119-22 (1986) (documenting authorities and cases following and
then disregarding or limiting Poller). Similarly, Poller's obvious application to the issue of actual
malice in constitutional defamation cases was limited by lower court reminders about the effect of
such actions on freedom of speech and of the press. See generally Louis, supra note 44, at 710-15.
In this area even the Supreme Court has adopted the practice of the countervailing cliche. Compare
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979) (noting the applicability of the Poller rule to
this area) with Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2514 (1986) (explaining the Hutchinson footnote as stating that in such cases the Poller rule is simply a nonabsolute caution). Missing
from all these opinions are efforts to develop workable doctrine setting forth the obvious compromise
intended. Indeed, the federal courts seem oblivious to the need for such doctrine and academic
efforts to develop it. See, e.g., Louis, supra note 44, at 714-15.
95. In his dissenting opinion in In Re Japanese Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1093 (3d
Cir. 1980), Judge Gibbons stated that a complexity exception to the seventh amendment would
"permit the exercise of trial court discretion," a discretion that "in any practical sense will be completely unreviewable," and that could "some times be influenced by unarticulated sympathies for or
hostilities toward the underlying policies sought to be advanced in the lawsuit." Such concerns are
applicable to other procedural rulings that are discretionary or that, by virtue of the doctrinal gap in
the center, are functionally discretionary.
96. Rosenberg, JudicialDiscretion ofthe Trial Court Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV.
635, 642 (1971) (discretion allows courts to fine tune the law by adjusting results to specific fact
situations).
97. In part because of the consequences of an erroneous ruling, the grant of a motion to the
merits of a claim or defense constitutes a question of law, which appellate courts may review without
mandatory deference to the lower court decision. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making
Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, The Judge!
Jury Question, and ProceduralDiscretion, 64 N.C.L. REv. 993, 1040 (1986) (noting and explaining
why the grant of any motion to the merits is a question of law).
98. See supra note 87 for a description of the manifestations of that emerging backlash.
99. Many recent opinions in support of or affirming the dismissal of factually deficient complaints asserting causes of action in the area of civil rights or securities fraud demand, in scatter-gun
fashion and in language reminiscent of older Code opinions, the specific allegation of a variety of
evidentiary facts, without regard to the plaintiff's lack of access to the evidence and need for discovery. E.g., Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979) (securities fraud), cert denied, 446
U.S. 946 (1980); Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663 (Ist Cir. 1979) (civil rights); Rotolo v. Borough of
Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1976) (civil rights); Additional cases in these two areas are collected
in Marcus, supra note 5, at 447-50. Similarly, many recent decisions granting or affirming the grant
of summary judgment in state of mind, unequal access to the evidence situations fail even to note the
presence of these once crucial factors, let alone to make allowance for them. See supra note 94.
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judges may create as many problems as it solves. Although more detailed explication of doctrine would seem to be the answer, it is difficult to prepare and is
not always understood and obeyed. Perhaps that is why appellate courts so
often resort to one-sided doctrine strongly or presumptively suggesting the result
favored. to
Having considered the general problems of reform, the discussion now
turns to its specifics, beginning with interception at the pleading stage.
B.

The Reintroduction of Fact Specificity Requirements in PleadingClaims
and Defenses

One way to intercept or discourage the assertion of factually questionable
claims and defenses is to require greater particularity in the pleadings asserting
them.101 Particularized fact pleading was the Field Code's most condemned
requirement, 10 2 however, and the first to be eliminated by the Federal Rules. 10 3
Its general reintroduction today would, therefore, probably be politically impossible, as well as unwise. Some people, however, would support the reimposition
of such a requirement upon selected claims and defenses, particularly those that
are inherently vague or doubtful or that seem to generate an abundance of complex, protracted litigation. The selection process could even be left to the courts,
some of which already have a few candidates in mind and no compunctions
about choosing them.'1 4 Such common-law implementation, however, would
obviously be controversial, random, and uncertain. It also would seem to violate
the Federal Rules, which specifically adopt a few such special pleading requirements in rule 9 and supposedly govern the rest of pleading through the more
general requirements of rule 8.105 Consequently, if such changes are to be made,
they probably should be effected by amendments to the Federal Rules. Rule
9(b), which already requires that averments of fraud and mistake be pleaded
with "particularity," could easily be amended to include other troublesome
claims and defenses.
Two popular candidates for inclusion in rule 9(b) are antitrust and civil
rights claims, both of which are inherently vague and seem to generate an abun100. See supra note 44 (setting forth several instances of one-sided preemptive doctrine interpreting the Federal Rules).
101. See supra note 24.
102. See supra notes 25-27.
103. See Marcus, supra note 5, at 439; supra note 34 and accompanying text.
104. The most familiar candidates are antitrust and other conspiracy cases. E.g., Heart Disease
Research Found. v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1972) (allegation of antitrust
conspiracy requires supporting facts); Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957) (rejecting arguments for applying a more demanding pleading standard to antitrust complaints). In
recent years securities fraud and civil rights cases have often been targeted. Marcus, supranote 5, at
447-51.
105. Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 924 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (Federal Rules contain no special pleading rules for civil rights cases).
Securities fraud cases, of course, do cite the particularity requirement of rule 9(b), which, in the
opinion of most commentators, does not require or support the extreme pleading requirements such
cases attribute to it. Marcus, supra note 5, at 447 n.87.
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dance of complex, protracted, and ultimately unsuccessful litigation.' 0 6 Both
claims, however, are founded on congressionally created rights. Undermining

them procedurally, which is the ultimate effect-and for some perhaps the purpose-of including them within rule 9(b), could be viewed, therefore, as an im-

proper judicial assault on substantive congressional policy and its chosen
beneficiaries. Thus, the selection of these or other candidates for this procedural
hit list would be endlessly controversial.
Moreover, because antitrust and civil rights claims often involve clandestine
wrongdoing and unequal access to the evidence, they sometimes cannot be
pleaded initially with particularity.10 7 To dismiss them on the merits before discovery often would be unjust and at odds with the preserve-the-merits philosophy of the Federal Rules.' 08 On the other hand, postponing interception until
after discovery-either by watering down the particularity requirement or by
creating exceptions thereto when access to the evidence is unequal-would effectively retain the status quo.' 0 9 Choosing the lesser of these two evils is not easy

and, as we shall see below, has continually divided the federal courts in their
interpretation and application of existing rule 9(b).
The definition and application of any such particularity requirement is also
very difficult. A century ago the courts were unable to state the Code's pleading
requirements clearly or apply them consistently." 0 In recent times federal
judges have not done much better with rule 9(b). Indeed, those currently making the effort often seem to be unaware of the difficulty, let alone of their inabil-

ity to surmount it. Moreover, particularity requirements are typically enforced
by means of interlocutory rulings'IIin factually unique, easily distinguished sit106. In recent years the number of civil rights cases filed have grown dramatically from 270 in
1961 to over 30,000 in 1981. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 533 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting). These cases already show a high incidence of rule 11 sanctions, Nelken, supra note 61,
at 1327, arguably a better way to deal with insubstantial civil rights claims than expanded pleading
requirements. See Rotolo, 532 F.2d at 922 (expanded pleading requirements designed to weed out
frivolous and insubstantial cases at an early stage in the litigation). Antitrust litigation has long been
regarded as the paradigm of the protracted or big case. See Report to the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Procedure in Antitrust and Other Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 62, 66-68 (1953);
Freund, The Pleading andPre-Trialof an Antitrust Claim, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 555 (1961). In recent
years courts have imposed substantial limitations upon the substantive reach of the antitrust laws.
Consequently, fewer private actions presumably are now being filed, those that are filed are more
easily disposed of before trial, and collectively such litigation doubtlessly does not burden the federal
courts as much as it once did.
107. See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (in antitrust
cases often "the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators"). See generally Louis,
supra note 44, at 714-15 (in constitutional defamation cases plaintiffs often lack equal access to
evidence of defendant's actual malice); Note, Pleading Securities Fraud Claims with Particularity
Under Rule 9(b), 97 HARV. L. REV. 1432, 1442 (1984) (noting the plaintiff's difficulty in securities
fraud cases of pleading with particularity when access to the evidence is often unequal).
108. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying test.
109. The postponement process, needless to say, creates waste and delay and provides a tactical
advantage to defendants, even though their pleading challenges are denied or delayed until after
discovery. Sovern, Reconsidering FederalCivil Rule 9(b): Do We Need ParticularizedPleadingRequirements in FraudCases, 104 F.R.D. 143, 150-51 (1984) (asserting that many rule 9(b) challenges
to fraud complaints result only in delay).
110. See supra note 26.
111. An appealable final judgment will result, of course, if a plaintiff is denied leave to amend,
stands on the complaint, or fails to supply what is demanded and eventually suffers a dismissal. But
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uations. Appellate control of these rulings tends, therefore, to be sporadic and
weak, and of necessity decisional power over such questions is concentrated in
the hands of the trial judges, whose numbers, isolation, and relative independence virtually guarantee diversity of opinion and nonuniform, sometimes
highly idiosyncratic and unjust, results.
Not surprisingly these very problems have continually plagued the federal
courts in their application and interpretation of the present particularity requirement of rule 9(b), the precise purpose and extent of which is still unresolved
almost fifty years after its adoption. Indeed, cases can be cited in support of
almost any colorable interpretation and approach thereto.1 12 By and large,
however, the cases can be divided into two basic approaches or lines of authority-one strict and one lenient and each generally oblivious of the other. 1 3 The
lenient approach holds that rule 9(b) merely enlarges the notice pleading requirements of rule 8(a) in order to overcome the vagueness inherent in allegations of fraud and mistake.1 14 If the pleading of fraud were governed only by
it appears that few cases are dismissed outright for failure to plead with sufficient particularity.
Sovern, supra note 109, at 150-51.
112. Early rule 9(b) cases emphasized that fraud allegations must be detailed enough to advise
defendant of the claim to be met, e.g., Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 54 F. Supp. 588,
591 (W.D. Pa. 1944), or that plaintiff must plead all the many material elements of fraud with
particularity, e.g., National Steel Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 18 F.R.D. 166, 168 (W.D. Pa.
1955); C.I.T. Fin. Corp. v. Sachs, 10 F.R.D. 397, 397-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Other courts emphasized
that rule 9(b) must be read in conjunction with the liberal pleading requirements of rule 8, e.g.,
United States v. Dittrich, 3 F.R.D. 475, 477 (E.D. Ky. 1943), that plaintiff need only plead ultimate
facts and not evidence, e.g., Brown v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 1 F.R.D. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), and
that the provision's basic purpose was to make plaintiff allege more than that merely "defendant
fraudulently induced the plaintiff to enter into a contract or something of that sort," Union Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Simon, 22 F.R.D. 186, 187 (E.D. Pa. 1958). This was the lenient view of the provision. In recent years, however, opinions have asserted that the provision is designed to minimize
strike suits, to protect the reputation of defendants from harm caused by allegations of moral turpitude, to assure that a complaint is based upon a reasonable belief, and to inhibit filing of complaints
as a pretext for discovery of unknown wrongs. E.g., Segan v. Dreyfus Corp., 513 F.2d 695 (2d Cir.
1975); Bender v. Rocky Mountain Drilling Assoc., 648 F. Supp. 330, 335-36 (D.D.C. 1986);
Goldman v. Belden, 98 F.R.D. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp. 714, 725
(M.D.N.C. 1980). See generally, Marcus, supra note 5, at 447 n.87 (arguing that these purposes do
not justify this strict version of the rule); Sovem, supra note 109, at 164-79; Note, supra note 107, at
1440-47. With one exception-harm to reputation-these new purposes, which amended rule 11
also attempts to control, appear to be modem rationalizations of the particularity requirement. At
common law, fraud was a disfavored action and required greater particularity in its pleading.
Sovern, supra note 109 at 144-47. Why then was mistake, obviously not an action or defense harmful to reputation, included in rule 9(b)? Moreover, why is it that today, when assaults on corporation reputations are commonplace and may include even more serious allegations of racketeering,
federal courts have suddenly developed this special concern for reputation? See Note, supra note
107, at 1446. In my opinion federal courts are concerned primarily with the threat of strike suits and
fishing expeditions in the securities industry and have simply seized upon rule 9(b) and its historical
link with the protection of reputation. Note, supra note 107, at 1440-43.
113. Most of the strict modem cases simply ignore the earlier, lenient cases. In one modem
case, however, Judge Friendly, having been cited cases from the lenient line, remarked: "We see no
profit in attempting to analyze these decisions, which may or may not be consistent and each of
which necessarily rests on its particular facts. We follow the rule laid down by our own decisions
....
" Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978).
114. E.g., Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 235 (1959) (reversing dismissal of a
complaint generally alleging that defendant was estopped by fraudulent or unintentional misrepresentations from relying upon the running of the statute of limitations); Denny v. Carey, 72 F.R.D.
574, 578 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (fraudulent conduct need not be alleged in great detail); Union Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Simon, 22 F.R.D. 186, 187 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (complaint must allege only something more
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rule 8(a), fraud in the sale of a house presumably could be generally alleged

without specifying its nature, 1 5 just as vehicular negligence may be generally
alleged under rule 8(a) without specifying its nature-for example, that defendant driver was intoxicated or speeding. 1 16 Hence, rule 9(b) requires only an
additional allegation identifying the nature of the fraud-for example, that de-

fendant fraudulently sold a house by falsely misrepresenting that it was free of
termite infestation.
Satisfying such a limited pleading requirement ordinarily will pose no real

problem for pleaders, even those who lack equal access to the evidence. Indeed,
most fraud and antitrust complaints probably are already that specific. But such

a limited requirement obviously will not make possible the desired early interception of factually doubtful claims and defenses.

By contrast the alternative, strict approach to rule 9(b) posits a provision
independent of rule 8(a) that requires a much higher level of factual particularity' 1 7 amounting to or at least approaching a prima facie demonstration of the

claim's factual validity"

8

and that is designed to make possible the interception

of factually doubtful claims and defenses. Whether this strict approach would
succeed at such interception and at what cost are the questions. Studies suggest

that despite the tough talk in opinions few fraud complaints are dismissed outright and that those evidencing the pleader's best efforts on the available evidence will ordinarily lead to the promised land of discovery.

19

Such results

obviously will not generally deter strike suits or ill-founded claims.' 20 On the
other hand, when dismissal is granted or results because the plaintiff fails to
supply the detail demanded, the interception/discouragement function is obviously served, but at the risk that meritorious claims will be prematurely termi-

nated.' 2 1 Practice under this strict approach to rule 9(b) also commonly reveals

some familiar, Code-like constants, the cost and delay of resolving "particularthan mere fraud). Official Form 13 of the Federal Rules, which alleges a fraudulent conveyance in
general terms, strongly suggests that the lenient approach is the correct interpretation of rule 9(b).
115. In Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Simon, 22 F.R.D. 186, 187 (E.D. Pa. 1958), the court stated
that "[t]he purpose of this rule is to require more of a plaintiff who charges a defendant with fraud
than merely a statement that 'the defendant fraudulently induced the plaintiff to enter into a contract' or something of that sort."
116. See Official Form 9, FED. R. Civ. P.
117. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
118. Judges employing the strict approach do not ordinarily articulate the requirement in these
terms, which are, of course, at odds with the general pleading philosophy of the Federal Rules. But
in their incessant demands for evidentiary detail and their avowed efforts to deter strike suits and
fishing expeditions, see supra note 112, they are obviously seeking something like a prima facie demonstration that the plaintiff has a bona fide, provable claim.
119. Sovern, supra note 109 at 150-51. It has been suggested that outright dismissal is inflicted
primarily upon claims that, in the court's private opinion, clearly lack real merit. Note, supra note
107, at 1442 n.52.
120. Sovern, supra note 109, at 171-77.
121. Note, supra note 107, at 1442. The danger obviously is greatest to claimants who lack
access to the evidence and need discovery to flesh out their allegations. Id. at 1436-39, 1442. Despite the familiarity of the problem of unequal access to the evidence, many of the opinions articulating the strict approach do not either mention the problem or do not make any doctrinal allowance
for it. See id. at 1436-39.

1989]

FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE

ity" challenges 122 and the general uncertainty as to what facts are required to
satisfy the approach. 123 These constants invite tactical challenges to all complaints governed by the provision, even though most such challenges do not result in dismissal before discovery.
Nothing in the language or history of rule 9(b) requires this strict approach,
which is so offensive to the general philosophy of the Federal Rules and so redolent of the dark ages of Code pleading. Consequently, I agree with those who
have concluded that the lenient interpretation of rule 9(b) is the correct one. 124
That conclusion obviously does not bar an amendment adopting the strict approach and adding other claims or defenses. But how would such an amendment define the requirement and deal with the problem of unequal access to the
evidence? Ignoring these problems would involve a fundamental retreat from
the pleading philosophy of the Federal Rules and a partial return to the injustices and waste of Code pleading. Permitting discovery in unequal access situations, however, would often frustrate the purpose of the amendment. Until these
problems can be resolved-and I see no answer other than a blind and, in my
opinion, unjustified faith in the case-by-case judgment of individual trial
judges t 2 5 -the case for an expanded particularity requirement cannot be made.
In any event, summary judgment and rule 11 sanctions both offer alternative,
arguably superior, means of dealing with the same problems and, as we shall see
below, have already been so employed.
C. Post-Discovery Interception-Summary Judgment
If more effective factual interception before discovery is not possible or
practical, then effective factual interception after discovery through the motion
for summary judgment is essential. For many years, however, summary judg1 26
ment was a chimera, a theoretical possibility often unattainable in practice.
The problem was not in the text of rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but in its restrictive interpretation and grudging application by federal
judges obsessively concerned with preserving the merits.1 27 This resistance to
summary judgment obviously could not withstand indefinitely the increasing
pressure of court congestion and escalating litigation costs, and eventually the
122. Sovern, supra note 109, at 150-51.
123. See supra note 112.
124. Marcus,supra note 5,at 447 n.87 (citing 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PRODEDURE § 1298, at 406 (1969); 2A J.MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICHER, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 9.03, at 9-28 (2d ed. 1985)).
125. Perhaps thoughtful judges are requiring only a best efforts
pleading attempt by plaintiff,
at
least
inunequal access cases, as a condition to reaching discovery,and dismiss only those claims that
clearly appear to be without merit. See supra note 121. There isno guarantee, however, that all
judges will
understand or follow this unarticulated rule. Presumably some reasonable Code judges
followed a similar rule, the general acceptance of which would have made the Code much more
workable.
126. Louis, supra note 44, at 708-09 (describing the doctrinal barriers to the use of summary
judgment); see also F.JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 12, § 5.19, at 274 (stating that the motion is
put to little
use). But see infra note 129 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 44.
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judicial tide turned. 128 In the past decade summary judgment motions have
29
been granted much more readily, even in areas once regarded almost as taboo'
and often to an accompaniment of judicial rhetoric suddenly responsive to the
need for more effective interception.' 30 These developments have now received
the imprimatur of the Supreme Court of the United States, which handed down
three supportive decisions in its 1985 term. 13' Even the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, long regarded as the circuit most hostile to sum32
mary judgement, has now publicly disavowed its alleged hostility.1
Although the federal courts now grant motions for summary judgment
more readily, they still have not specifically replaced the underlying legal doctrine developed years ago in support of their more restrictive approach. They
have simply developed a set of countervailing cliches in support of granting the
motion.' 3 3 Now, depending on whether the motion is denied or granted, either
the old restrictive cliches or the new generous ones are cut and pasted into the
opinion. The actual decisional process appears to rely primarily on the facts of
each case and a general, unarticulated sense of when summary judgment is appropriate. This "discretionary" process could become arbitrary and unjust or
lead to a backlash if trial courts, anxious to respond to the problems of today,
begin to grant summary judgment too eagerly and readily.13 4 In short, it poses
the very problems and dangers described above of an unexplicated shift towards
135
balanced procedural doctrine.
Over a decade ago I decried the prevailing, restrictive view of summary
judgment, predicted that a more vigorous use of the procedure was inevitable,
and proposed new doctrine to explain, guide, and ultimately contain this new
128. Louis, supra note 44, at 709-10.
129. Even in cases involving state of mind questions, for which summary judgment was once
thought inappropriate, see supra note 53, summary judgment is being used with increasing regularity. Louis, supra note 44, at 709-710; see also Calkins, supra note 94, at 1104 (suggesting that summary judgment played an important role in antitrust cases despite doctrinal cautions against its use
there).
130. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 447 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (rule 56 must also be construed with due
regard for "the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses"); Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit
Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1978) (summary judgment must be used to counter the attraction
of the antitrust treble damage remedy towards vexatious litigation), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982
(1979).
131. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Celotex, 447 U.S.
317; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 447 U.S. 242 (1986).
132. Knight v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986) (opinion stating that the
perception that this court is unsympathetic to summary judgment is "decidedly inaccurate at the
present time"), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932 (1987).
133. In response to the Pollercaution that summary judgment should be used sparingly in antitrust cases involving state of mind issues, see supra note 53, courts now respond that the rule is not
absolute and that much can be gained through the summary disposition of meritless, protracted
cases. E.g., Texaco Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Medina, 834 F.2d 242, 247 (1st Cir. 1987) (courts now more
freely affirm grants of summary judgment in antitrust cases and such cases do not require special
treatment); accord Coverdell v. Department of Social and Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 769 (9th Cir.
1987) (summary judgment useful in disposing of meritless civil rights actions despite presence of
state of mind issues).
134. Some evidence of such a tendency has already appeared. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 93-100.
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vigor.13 6 This proposal achieved wide academic currency and approval 137 but,

until recently, almost no recognition by the federal courts, which seemed to be
almost unaware of the emerging doctrinal vacuum. In its recent decision in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, however, the Supreme Court recognized and appears, in
part at least, to support this new approach. 138 Except for Justice Brennan's

dissenting opinion, however, the Supreme Court's doctrinal development is minimal and so buried within the opinions that it may be discernible only to the
most careful observer. Consequently, I shall restate that approach here and
show what parts the Court has embraced and what questions remain open.

Although rule 56 seems to treat all motions for summary judgment alike,
functionally such motions can be divided into two types: those motions by a
party seeking to establish the existence of a claim for relief or affirmative defense
that the party has pleaded and upon which she bears the trial proof burden
(hereafter sometimes referred to as a motion by a party with the trial proof
burden), and those motions by a party seeking to establish the nonexistence of
facts upon which the opposing or nonmoving party bears the trial proof burden
(hereafter sometimes referred to as a motion by a party without the trial proof
burden).' 39 The paradigm example of the second type is a motion by a defendant seeking to show the nonexistence of an essential element of the plaintiff's
claim for relief. Those who move for summary judgment must satisfy burdens
of production and persuasion.14° Because of the seventh amendment, the burdens imposed upon a moving party with the trial proof burden are very heavy
and cannot be lightened.141 For years these same heavy burdens were also imposed upon motions for summary judgment by the party without the trial proof

burden, even though the seventh amendment was inapplicable. 1 42 The end re-

136. Louis, supra note 24.
137. Louis, supra note 44, at 715 n.49.
138. Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 331. The foundation of this approach is the contention that
different burdens may and should be imposed when a motion for summary judgment is made by a
party who seeks to show the nonexistence of an essential element of a claim or defense that has been
asserted by the nonmoving party and upon which the nonmoving party bears the trial proof burden.
Louis, supra note 24, at 748. In Celotex both Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority and
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion adopt this distinction. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-34 (Rehnquist,
J., for the majority), 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. These burdens are essentially the same as those imposed on a party with the trial proof
burden moving for directed verdict. In both cases this party must present proof so strong no reasoning person may reject it. Louis, supra note 24, at 748-49. This heavy burden may well be a requirement of the constitutional right of trial by jury established by the seventh amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. Cf Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-96 (1943) (insubstantial verbal changes in directed verdict standard would not violate right to jury trial; presumably substantial changes would).
142. Louis, supra note 24, at 751-52 (under traditional summary judgment doctrine, the moving
party without the trial proof burden was required to demonstrate the nonexistence of an essential
element of the nonmoving party's claim or defense with proof so strong no reasoning person could
reject it, the constitutional standard imposed upon the party with the burden of proof). At trial,
however, the party without the burden of proof is not required to present any evidence of a fact's
nonexistence to obtain a directed verdict; it is enough that the party with the burden of proof has
failed to present a prima facie case. Hence, in moving for summary judgment, the party without the
trial proof burden should not be constitutionally required to present overwhelming evidence of the
same fact's nonexistence. To discourage meritless, tactical motions, this party perhaps should face

1044

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

suit was an unwise, constitutionally unnecessary impediment to the factual interception of doubtful claims and defenses-what had become both statistically and
43
strategically the most important use of the motion for summary judgment.1
In Celotex the Supreme Court finally recognized the distinction between the
two functional forms of the motion 44 and implied that in the case of a motion
by the party without the trial proof burden, the movant's production burden
should be different and presumably lighter. 145 That same term the Court had
already held that if the moving party's production burden is discharged, an opposing party with the trial proof burden must respond with prima facie proof. 146
In neither case, however, did the Court attempt to redefine this moving party's
production burden.1 47 The lower federal courts have also ducked this question,
but in practice today they sometimes accept less than their traditional, still unrepudiated doctrine requires. 148 This judicial failure to reexamine the moving
party's production burden is inexplicable, given the importance of the question
and the obviousness of the answer. There are three possible lesser burdens of
production that might be imposed upon the moving party seeking to show the
nonexistence of a fact: a reasonable or persuasive amount of proof, prima facie
some smaller production burden. Louis, supra note 24, at 753, 759. But that would be a policy
determination, not a constitutional requirement.
143. See Louis, supra note 24, at 745 n.4 (survey of summary judgment cases showing that a
majority of the motions were made by defendants seeking to show the nonexistence of an essential
element of plaintiff's claim for relief).
144. See supra note 138.
145. Celotex says nothing specific about the production burden imposed on a defendant who
seeks to establish through affirmative evidence the nonexistence of an essential element of the plaintiff's claim. Celotex merely gives this moving party defendant the option of showing that the plaintiff lacks prima facie proof of one or more essential elements of the claim. See infra text
accompanying notes 157-60. This option often will be expensive and impractical, however, see infra
text accompanying notes 163-64, and, as a result, eventually there will be consideration of a reduction in the defendant's traditional production burden. When that consideration occurs, Celotex's
recognition of the basic distinction between a motion by the party with and the party without the
trial proof burden, see supra note 138, should help to achieve a relaxation in the production burden
imposed upon the moving party without the trial proof burden.
146. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 447 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986).
147. Id. at 250 n.4; see supra note 145. The question of the moving party's burden seems to be
addressed only when the opposing party submits no affidavits or other materials in response to the
motion. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157-160 (1970) (defendant discharged
its burden of showing no preexisting agreement with local police to deny plaintiff lunch counter
service but failed to preview any proof of the nonexistence of a similar agreement made after plaintiff
entered defendant's store followed by a policeman). Most opposing plaintiffs do submit some materials, however. Courts then could, but ordinarily do not, engage in a two-step analysis, asking first
whether the defendant has discharged its burden as the moving party and then asking whether the
plaintiff's response is adequate. Instead, courts simply ask, under standards yet to be clearly defined,
whether on the basis of all the previewed proof a genuine issue of fact exists. Arguably Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324, and Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248-50, resolve this standard as follows: if the plaintiff
elects to respond, it must respond with prima facie proof of the challenged essential element. See
infra note 173, suggesting that lower federal courts may have so construed Celotex. To my knowledge, however, no court has specifically refused to engage in the two-step approach described above
or denied a plaintiff whose challenge to the defendant's proof failed an opportunity to submit affidavits and contend at a second hearing that they raised genuine issues of material fact. If courts eventually hold that neither option is available, they will force a plaintiff to choose between previewing her
own proof and challenging the discharge by the defendant of his burden as the moving party. Because most plaintiffs would probably choose the former, few would get to challenge the latter, which
would remain an open and generally ignored question.
148. Louis, supra note 44, at 709-12.
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proof, or no proof at all. The first possibility has no analog in civil procedure
and would be difficult to define and apply; 149 the last, which has some academic
support,150 has been uniformly rejected by the federal courts.15 1 That leaves
prima facie proof, which is a well-defined concept, as the only acceptable
standard.
The objection to a prima facie production burden is that it can be met so
easily. The eyewitness affidavit of a party, which is prima facie proof, will itself
15 2
satisfy this burden and shift to the opposing party the burden of response.
But the opposing party can also discharge her burden of response with such an
affidavit, or any other prima facie proof.1 53 If she cannot obtain such proof by
the time discovery is completed, why should she be permitted to escape summary judgment and proceed to trial? Such a result may seem unfair when she
lacks equal access to the evidence, but even in this situation her chances to obtain the missing evidence at trial are very slim. If, however, she has some evidence, though falling short of a prima facie case, and reasonable prospects for
obtaining the rest at trial, she may ask the court to deny the motion under rule
56(f) and allow her to proceed to trial anyway. 154 This discretionary dispensational power is rarely mentioned in recent opinions advocating a more vigorous
use of summary judgment. Without it, however, summary judgment could become an oppressive tool, particularly in its application to issues of conspiracy,
intent, or state of mind, and other situations involving unequal access to the
evidence.
In the Celotex 15 5 decision the Supreme Court of the United States recognized an alternative route to the discharge of defendant's production burden.
There, fifteen manufacturers and distributors of asbestos had been charged with
wrongful death. Defendant Celotex successfully moved for summary judgment
because in answers to interrogatories plaintiff was unable to name any witnesses
who could testify to decedent's exposure to Celotex products.1 56 The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that under rule 56 defendant must make an affirmative showing that decedent had not been exposed to its products. 157 The
149. Louis, supra note 24, at 753.
150. Currie, Thoughts on Directed Verdicts andSummary Judgments, 45 U. CHi. L. REv. 72, 78
(1977) (suggesting that the moving party without the trial proof burden should face no production
burden whatsoever).
151. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332 (Brennan J., dissenting). The objection to eliminating this burden
altogether is that it could allow summary judgment to be a "tool for harassment." Id. Such motions, however, are now subject to the sanctions of amended rule 11, which might itself be sufficient
to discourage meritless, tactical motions by defendants. Nevertheless, a plaintiff still "might contend
that [such a] minimal effort on the part of defendant would compel him to develop a prima facie case
before trial, reduce it to affidavits or other supporting materials satisfying the requirements of rule
56(e), and disclose it all to defendant." Louis, supra note 24, at 756; accord Risinger, supra note 87,
at 41-42.
152. Louis, supra note 24, at 755 (interested party's affidavit is prima facie proof of a fact's
nonexistence).
153. Cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986).
154. Louis, supra note 24, at 767-69 (analyzing the requirements of rule 56(f)).
155. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-37.
156. Id. at 319-20.
157. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 184-85 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 477
U.S. 317 (1986).
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Supreme Court unanimously rejected this conclusion, holding that a moving

party without the trial proof burden may also discharge the production burden
with a demonstration that the opposing party lacks or cannot obtain prima facie

proof of an essential element of the challenged claim. 158 The Court, however,
divided over the question of whether defendant had satisfactorily demonstrated

plaintiff's lack of evidence. In response to a previous motion for summary judgment, plaintiff had proffered three inadmissible documents suggesting that decedent had been exposed to Celotex products.'

59

Being inadmissible, these

documents probably could not satisfy plaintiff's burden of response, but they did
identify at least one person who might so testify in plaintiff's behalf. 160
Although defendant knew of this potential witness when it again moved for
summary judgment, it made no effort to expose this person's testimony as un-

availing. For this reason at least four,161 and probably five, ' 62 of the justices felt

that defendant had failed to demonstrate plaintiff's lack of evidence. In other

words, perhaps defendant was required to depose or obtain an affidavit from
every witness named by plaintiff in order to satisfy its burden under this alterna-

tive approach.' 6 3 If that is so, then Celotex is hardly a simplified approach to
summary judgment for defendants. Indeed, as I suggested more than a decade

ago, although this approach
is necessary when direct proof is generally lacking and commends itself

whenever the opposing party's witnesses are few and can be deposed
without undue effort or expense[, it can be] burdensome and costly

when the opposing party potentially will rely upon a large number of
witnesses or documents. In such a situation the second approach [of
offering affirmative proof of the nonexistence of the essential element]
may be more attractive. 64
For these reasons Celotex does not seem to be a milestone in the law of

summary judgment.'

65

Admittedly, the majority opinion states that there is no

genuine issue of material fact, and summary judgment, therefore, is appropriate
158. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-27.
159. Id. at 335 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The three documents, all of which were hearsay, consisted of the transcript of a deposition upon oral examination of the decedent taken before his death,
a letter from an official of one of decedent's former employers whom petitioner planned to call as a
trial witness, and a letter from an insurance company to plaintiff's attorney. All three documents
tended to show that decedent had been exposed to petitioner's asbestos products.
160. Id. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion arguing that defendant's showing had not been sufficient to obtain summary judgment, Id. at 336-37
(Brennan, J., dissenting). In a separate dissenting opinion Justice Stevens found that the insurance
company letter, see supra note 159, was sufficient to bar summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 338
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Moreover, the five Justices in the majority did not find that the motion
should be granted. They found only that there was no legal bar to a grant of the motion and remanded the case for a finding on whether the motion in fact should be granted. Id. at 327-28.
162. In a separate concurring opinion, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 328, Justice White said that a plaintiff "need not also depose his witnesses or obtain their affidavits to defeat a summary judgment
motion asserting only that he has failed to produce any support for his case. It is the defendant's
task to negate, if he can, the claimed basis for the suit." Id. (White, J., concurring).
163. Id. (White, J., concurring) (quoted in supra note 162); id. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
164. Louis, supra note 24, at 751.
165. Accord Calkins, supra note 94, at 1115.
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if a nonmoving party cannot establish the existence of an essential element of his
case.' 6 6 This language, however, correctly describes the opposing party's burden of response. It says nothing about what the moving party must do to trigger
that burden. Perhaps it suggests to some readers that the moving party need not
do very much. In the very next paragraph, however, Justice Rehnquist reminds
us that "a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying
those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." 167 What this
demonstration must consist of is not indicated, a "lack of clarity" that, says
Justice Brennan in dissent, probably will produce confusion at the district court
level.' 68 Justice Brennan clearly rejects as insufficient a conclusory assertion
that the opposing party has no evidence. 169 The demonstration instead must be
a substantial one. Thus, if the moving party ignores a witness who apparently
could provide relevant evidence for the opposing party, the moving party has
failed to discharge its initial burden of production and the motion must automatically be denied. 170 Perhaps some members of the majority would not go this
far. 171 Justice White, however, apparently would. 172 Thus, he and the dissenters appear to constitute a majority that denies Celotex any true revolutionary
potential. 173
166. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
167. Id. at 323 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). To satisfy this burden the moving party must
identify portions of the record that affirmatively show that the plaintiff lacks evidence to establish an
essential element of her case, for example plaintiff Catrett's failure in answering interrogatories to
name any witnesses who could testify to the fact in issue, a failure which was treated as an admission
that plaintiff had no such witnesses. Thus, it would not be sufficient for a defendant to note only that
the record contains no evidence affirmatively establishing the plaintiff's contentions. The record
must contain admissions or the equivalent affirmatively establishing that the plaintiff cannot prove
her contentions. Of course if the burden is waived whenever the plaintiff responds with her own
proof, then as a practical matter the burden ordinarily will not exist. See supra note 147.
168. Celotex, 447 U.S. at 329 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171. The majority merely remanded the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with its
holding that the moving party could properly support its motion with a showing that plaintiff lacked
prima facie proof. Celotex, 447 U.S. at 327-28.
172. See supra note 162.
173. This is not to deny the occasional usefulness of the Celotex alternative or the importance of
Celotex, Liberty Lobby, and Matsushita as indicative of the Court's present favorable attitude towards the use of summary judgment. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. But to some these
decisions, particularly Celotex, seemed to represent a breakthrough that would unleash summary
judgment against all doubtful claims. This belief finds no real support in the Celotex opinion, see
supra note 167, or the subsequent cases citing it. On the other hand, a scan of the recent court of
appeals decisions citing Celotex shows a heavy emphasis on the majority's restatement of the opposing party's burden of response, see supranote 166 and accompanying text, and little concern with the
moving party's burden of production, see supra note 167 and accompanying text. Indeed, most of
these opinions merely assert or assume that the moving party has met the production burden without
citing the portions of the record or the preview of evidence establishing this conclusion. Only one
recent opinion holds that the moving party has failed to satisfy the burden of production. Higgins v.
Scherr, 837 F.2d 155, 156-57 (4th Cir. 1988) (reversing a trial judge's grant of summary judgment
against plaintiff on three claims for services rendered because defendant had, at best, demonstrated
plaintiff's lack of evidence with respect to only one of the three claims). Given this disappointing,
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Justice Brennan's helpful exegesis on the Celotex approach leaves many
questions unanswered. He argues that the moving party must expose as unhelpful the testimony of those witnesses properly identified by the opposing
party 174 but never indicates what constitutes proper identification. If the opposing party, for example, tendered a list of one hundred potential witnesses, would
the moving party have to depose, interview, or obtain affidavits from each of
them in order to perfect the Celotex approach? Or would the opposing party, as
in Celotex, also first have to make some showing that the persons named were in
fact potentially helpful witnesses? Not requiring such a showing might allow
unscrupulous plaintiffs to thwart the Celotex approach, even though they would
presumably expose themselves to rule 11 sanctions. On the other hand, requiring such a showing could lead to endless disputes over its sufficiency. In any
event, if the opposing party identifies relatives, employees, or friends as potential
witnesses, i.e. persons from whom he presumably may readily obtain affidavits,
arguably he should bear the minimal burden of exposing their testimony.' 75
Otherwise the moving party would be saddled with the much higher cost of
deposing these presumably hostile witnesses. Moreover, if the testimony of
many of the identified witnesses is likely to be cumulative-for example, the
witnesses to an airplane crash-perhaps the moving party can discharge his burden with an acceptable sample of this testimony and the averment that no contrary witnesses are known to exist. 176 Finally, perhaps there should come a
time-presumably at the close of discovery, at the final pretrial conference, or on
the eve of trial-when the opposing party, in response to a showing that a prima
facie case is lacking, must finally deliver the missing proof and can no longer
simply point to the existence of potential witnesses or other information subject
to subpoena at trial. Such a rule would help to make summary judgment the
ruthlessly efficient interception device that some persons desire.
Not surprisingly this discussion of Celotex has returned us to the fundamental, unresolved question of summary judgment: What is the burden of production on the moving party, particularly the defendant, when this party will
not have the burden of proof at trial? Ultimately it really does not matter very
much whether the defendant employs the Celotex approach or the traditional
one. As defendant's production burden rises, both the cost and difficulty of succeeding on the motion and the system's inability to intercept spurious or unprovable claims rises. As defendant's burden falls, claimants will find it increasingly
difficult to reach trial and the jury. A minimal burden, says Justice Brennan,
"would simply permit summary judgment procedure to be converted into a tool
cliched, one-sided view of Celotex in the courts of appeals, a real shift in the direction of granting
summary judgment is certainly possible.
174. Celotex, 447 U.S. at 332-33.
175. Cf. Louis, supra note 24, at 754 (suggesting that the burden of exposing the testimony of a
friendly witness should fall on the party who is the witness' friend and presumably can readily obtain
an affidavit from him).
176. Cf. Dale Hilton, Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 468, 472-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(allowing a party moving for summary judgment to sample a large number of similarly situated
potential witnesses).
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for harassment." 1 77 Such harassment, however, is subject to rule 11 sanctions
and might not be a major problem. On the other hand, some plaintiffs with
prospects for success at trial cannot readily or economically assemble a prima
facie case before trial. Should such plaintiffs sometimes still be permitted8 to
17
escape summary judgment and go to trial, as rule 56(f) currently allows?

These many unresolved summary judgment questions, and the disappointing slowness of the federal courts in recognizing and dealing with them,

suggest that amendment of rule 56 may, as in the case of rule 11, again be the
superior route to reform. Not surprisingly the amendment process is already

well under way. The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States (the Committee) currently has under
179
study sweeping changes in interception practice under the Federal Rules.
Most of these changes, however, are structural and organizational and will cause
no real change in current practice. Thus, the proposal merges all interception
motions going to the merits-the motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6), the mo-

tion for judgment on the pleadings under rule 12(c), the motion to strike a legally insufficient defense under rule 12(f), the motions for directed verdict and
judgment notwithstanding the verdict under rule 50, and the motion for summary judgment under rule 56-into a proposed rule 56 entitled JudgmentAs A
Matter ofLaw.18 0 In addition, many of the operative provisions of present rule

56 have been transferred to a proposed rule 40(b) entitled Establishment of Law
and Fact. Proposed rule 40(b) establishes the procedures for finding that material facts are not genuinely in dispute and sometimes permits such findings even
though they cannot result in the entry of judgment.18 1 When such findings

would permit the entry of judgment, the proceeding becomes a motion for judgment as a matter of law under proposed rule 56. In short, the two rules combine
177. Celotex, 447 U.S. at 332.
178. See generally Louis, supra note 44, at 720; Louis, supra note 24, at 767-69 (both considering
what rule 56(f) presently requires to permit a plaintiff without a prima facie case to escape summary
judgment and proceed to trial).
179. Reporter's Tentative Draft, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Advisory
Committee, July, 1987 [hereinafter Draft Amendments].
180. Proposed Rule 56, Judgment As a Matter of Law, Draft Amendments, supra note 179.
These motions can be divided into two types: those motions that challenge the face of a pleadingrules 12(b)(6), 12(c), and 12(f); and those motions that challenge the sufficiency of the evidence or a
preview thereof-rules 50, 56. Both types of motion similarly assert, however, that the challenged
claim or defense can be resolved as a matter of law without the necessity of a trial to decide disputed
questions of fact. Is this common thread a sufficient reason to unite all these motions into one?
Clearly all the motions of the first type should be united. Whether these motions should be united
with the fact-based motions for summary judgment, directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding
the verdict is the more difficult question. Moreover, because the ancillary procedures of rules 56 and
50 are so different, a case can be made for keeping these two fact-based motions separate.
181. In response to an unsuccessful motion for summary judgment, courts today are permitted
under present rule 56(d) to find that the moving party has at least established that certain "material
facts exist without substantial controversy." Proposed rule 40(b) would permit an original motion to
establish that a fact exists, even though its existence cannot itself result in summary judgment. Committee Note, Pre-TrialEstablishment ofFacts, Proposed rule 40, Draft Amendments, supra note 179.
Because such motions could be wasteful and invite tactical use, the procedure's availability is limited
and subject to the trial judge's discretion. Committee Note, Limitation on Motion Practice Under
This Rule, Proposed rule 40, Draft Amendments, supra note 179.
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to govern the summary disposition of claims; proposed rule 40(b) alone governs
the summary disposition of material facts.
These proposed changes recast the interception provisions of the Federal
Rules into a coherent framework freed at last from the historical baggage of the
Code and the common law. The present rules, however, are well understood
and trouble free, at least in the areas marked for change, and the proposals may
be resisted, therefore, as cosmetic and unnecessary. The great disappointment is
the Committee's failure to confront the unsettled questions of federal intercep-

tion practice, in particular the questions plaguing summary judgment. In an
effort to atone in part for this omission, the Committee has included the following paragraph within the Comment to Proposed Rule 56:
THE PRETRIAL MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. Proposed subdivision (b)
(2) of this rule would clarify the burdens imposed on a moving party
seeking a pretrial judgment as a matter of law. The moving party,
whether or not having the burden of proof on an issue, must at least
specify the fact as an appropriate one for determination as one not
genuinely in dispute and explain the basis on which such a determination can be made. There is, however, no burden to disprove the existence of a fact that the moving party would not have the burden of
proving at trial. Cf. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 Sup.Ct. 2548, 2555.
And the moving party may rely upon the pleadings of the adversary to
demonstrate the absence of genuine dispute, at least until the opposing
party comes forward with amendments or affidavits suggesting the
existence of contrary evidence. The opposing party, likewise without
respect to burdens of proof, is required to identify any triable issues
which would justify retention of the case on the court's docket. No
longer applicable is the line of cases based in part on the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970),
which placed on the proponent of judgment the burden of disproving
the availability of evidence to his adversary, even where the adversary
and would expewould at trial bear the burden of producing evidence
1 82
rience an adverse judgment on failing to do so.
The above paragraph attempts to make an all-inclusive statement about the
burdens imposed upon those who seek pretrial judgment as a matter of law,
namely those who today would make any of the motions that are to be merged
into proposed rule 56. With one notable exception, however, there is no dispute
or controversy with respect to the burdens imposed upon those who make these
motions. Therefore, most of what the paragraph says is of no real consequence.
The notable exception is the motion for summary judgment by the party without
the burden of proof at trial, and what the above paragraph says about the burden imposed on this moving party could be important. In this regard the paragraph seems to make the following statement: a moving party without the trial
proof burden must at least specify that a fact is not genuinely in issue and explain the basis on which such a determination can be made; this moving party
182. Committee Note, The PretrialMotionfor Judgment, Proposed rule 56, Draft Amendments,
supra note 179.
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need not, however, disprove either the fact's existence or the availability of evidence to the opposing party to prove the fact at trial.18 3 At first blush this is
merely a restatement of the Celotex decision and can be criticized, like the majority opinion there, for its obvious failure to show how the moving party can
"explain" the basis of the contention that there is no genuine issue without
either disproving the fact's existence or the availability of evidence to the opposing party to prove its existence. In its unequivocal rejection, however, of the
moving party's need to prove the unavailability of such evidence to the opposing
party, the paragraph implies that something less than what the dissenters and
Justice White required to satisfy the Celotex approach will now suffice.1 84 What
that "something less" might be, however, is unclear.
There is also an important but unannounced change in the Committee's
proposals. Present rule 56(f) is repealed and reincarnated in proposed rule
40(b)(2), the comment to which suggests it is even more protective of the opposing party than the present rule. 185 The proposed rule, however, omits language
from present rule 56(f) allowing an opposing party to whom affidavits are unavailable sometimes even to reach trial anyway.I8 6 This discretionary, dispensational power is, as described above, a necessary safety valve for summary
judgment practice, particularly in cases in which a claimant lacks equal access to
the evidence and would otherwise have to respond before trial with prima facie
proof whenever a defendant swore to his or her denials. In combination with an
extreme reading of Celotex, this repeal of rule 56(f) would create a new order in
which summary judgment could ruthlessly eliminate almost all hard-to-prove
claims before trial.' 87 Perhaps that is what the times demand, but it is a major
departure from the protect-the-merits philosophy of the Federal Rules. If the
Committee supports such a change, it should say so clearly and set forth its
reasons.
In sum, this recodification is very disappointing. The focus is on unimportant, though unobjectionable, cosmetic changes to general interception practice.
The major unresolved questions of summary judgment and the new Celotex approach are mostly ignored. It is as if the old car, having been sent to the garage
183. The paragraph suggests that a line of cases based in part on Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144 (1970), once placed on a moving party defendant the task of disproving the availability
of evidence to the plaintiff to establish an essential element of plaintiff's case. That is a novel indictment of Adickes. The two court of appeals justices who initially decided Celotex incorrectly, Catrett
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cited Adickes for the proposition
that a defendant cannot discharge the moving party's burden in this manner but must demonstrate
with affirmative evidence the nonexistence of an essential element of the plaintiff's case. In Celotex,
however, the Court not only rejected such a requirement but denied that Adickes had ever imposed
it. Celotex, 447 U.S. at 325, 334; accord Louis, supra note 24, at 764. Hence, I see no reason why
the Committee should still be flogging this dead horse.
184. See supra notes 161-62, 171-72.
185. Committee Note, Discovery and Investigation Prior To Establishment, Proposed rule 40(b)

(2), Draft Amendments, supra note 179.
186. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
187. The paradigm case for this exercise of rule 56(f) discretion is one in which key witnesses
hostile to the opposing party have been evasive in deposition and this party, who lacks access to the
evidence but still possesses proof approaching a prima facie case, seeks to examine them at trial as on
cross-examination. Louis, supra note 44, at 718-19.
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for a tuneup, was returned with a new paint job but with the engine still sputtering. Perhaps the Committee was unable to reach a consensus on these unanswered questions. If so, then perhaps rule 56 should not be amended until a
comprehensive solution can be proposed.

D. Sanctions and Cost Shifting
The success rate of an interception system probably cannot be significantly
raised without also threatening to terminate some claims and defenses that raise

genuine issues of fact. For this reason such systems generally err on the side of,
or give the benefit of the doubt to, the party opposing interception. 1

Factual

interception also must ordinarily await the completion of discovery 18 9 despite its
high cost and potential tactical value. Consequently, interception systems cannot always discourage the prosecution of marginal claims and defenses and may
even invite their assertion if the cost of defeating them is high enough. One
solution to this dilemma is financial, the imposition of monetary sanctions or the
shifting of costs to the losing party. Thus, most procedural systems tax the winning party's costs against the losing party.190 Foreign systems usually include
the attorney's fees within the bill of costs; American systems traditionally do
not. 191 Since the attorney's fees generally are by far the largest cost item, their

noninclusion in American systems means that these systems usually cannot provide adequate economic disincentives.

American systems, however, traditionally permit the imposition of sanctions upon procedural miscreants, including those who willfully assert baseless
claims and defenses. At the time of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, for example, federal courts had inherent power to proceed by contempt or summary application against miscreant attorneys; 19 2 they had statutory power to make counsel personally liable for increased "costs" produced by
t 93
his or her "multiplying. . . proceedings . . . unreasonably and vexatiously";
and under rule 11 they had power to strike pleadings signed with intent to defeat

the rule's purposes and to discipline attorneys for willful violations thereof.
All of these powers, however, were subject to doubts, gaps, or ambiguities
188. On motions for summary judgment, directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion;

this party also must receive the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the
evidence. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2.
189. See supra note 38.

190. See generally Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-64 (1975)
(historical review of the American practice of awarding costs but not attorney fees).
191. See generally Symposium, Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1984)
(everything anyone ever wanted to know about the question).
192. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765-66 (1980). See generally Risinger, supra

note 44, at 44-52 (describing the Anglo-American practice of punishing attorneys who act in bad
faith). In Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 258-59, and F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417
U.S. 116, 129 (1974), the Supreme Court stated that even attorneys' fees may be awarded if the
opposing party acts in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.
193. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927 (West Supp. 1988).
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that the federal courts generally declined to overcome,1 94 in part out of a genuine reluctance to sanction attorneys for litigation-related misconduct.195 With
attorneys correspondingly reluctant to seek sanctions, 196 the system became impotent and invited the many abuses that followed. 197 Indeed, by 1975 litigation
abuses, particularly in discovery, were reported to be both frequent and flagrant,
but courts generally refused to react until "provoked beyond endurance."' t 9 8 Finally in 1976 the United States Supreme Court signaled a change in attitude
towards sanctions and an end to the heyday of the adversary system.1 99 By
1979, however, the federal courts were still hesitant, even with adequate statutory authorization, to impose heavy sanctions upon egregious misconduct. 2° °
The sum total of these deficiencies in federal litigation sanctions seemed to

require amendment of the Federal Rules. In 1983 rule 11 was totally rewritten, 20 1 and its substance was also incorporated into a new discovery provision.22 The rule now provides that the required signature of an attorney or
party proceeding pro se upon a pleading or motion certifies that it has an ade-

quate legal and factual basis, as determined "after reasonable inquiry," and that
it is not interposed for "any improper purpose." For a violation of the rule,
sanctions, usually attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred in defeating the
pleading or motion, 20 3 are now mandatory 2°4 and may be imposed upon either

the party, the attorney, or both. Findings of willfulness or bad faith are not
20 5

required to impose sanctions, and good faith is not a defense.
These amendments to rule 11, which were designed to "reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions," to reduce "pleading and motion abuses,"
and to "discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litiga194. Risinger, supra note 44, at 42-61 (reviewing federal judicial reluctance to interpret these
provisions aggressively).
195. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under The New FederalRule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181,
183 (1985).
196. Miller, supra note 4, at 24-25.
197. Miller, supra note 4, at 15, 18-19.
198. R. RODE, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 85 (Fed. Jud. Center 1981).
199. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976)
(per curiam) (in awarding sanctions-in this case for discovery abuse-courts are free to consider
the general deterrent effect such awards will have on the instant case and on litigation in general).
200. See, e.g., Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp, 602 F.2d
1062, 1066-68 (2d Cir. 1979) (well-known decision holding, but only after a great deal of huffing and
puffing, that on egregious facts amounting to "a grossly negligent failure to obey an order compelling
discovery" a serious sanction such as preclusion under rule 37(b)(2)(B) may be imposed).
201. See generally FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee notes (1983) (explaining the reasons
for the amendment).
202. New rule 26(g) imposes a similar certification requirement upon discovery requests and
responses. In addition rule 16(f) now authorizes the imposition of sanctions, including those serious
sanctions for discovery abuses listed in rule 37(b)(2), upon parties and attorneys who misbehave with
respect to scheduling and pretrial conferences or orders issued pursuant thereto.
203. One survey reports that in 96% of the cases studied in which rule 11 sanctions were imposed, "reasonable" costs and attorneys' fees were awarded. Nelken, supra note 61, at 1333.
204. Rule 11 states that for a "violation of this rule, the court ... shall impose... an appropriate
sanction." The Advisory Committee Note, however, states that a court has discretion to tailor its
sanction to the facts of the case. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee notes (1983). Presumably
that permits merely a slap on the wrist in appropriate situations.
205. Schwarzer, supra note 195, at 195-96.
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tion process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses," 20 6 seem to be succeeding. 20 7 Attorneys apparently are no longer reluctant to request sanctions,
and the federal courts generally have accepted the obligation to impose them,

thus far without artificial limitations of any kind.20 8 Indeed, rule 11 has become
a familiar and important feature of federal civil practice, and inevitably it must
209
achieve at least some of its authors' goals.
Since rule 11 became effective, the federal courts have rendered more than a
thousand decisions thereunder, 210 enough to reveal some trends. Initially the

practice was concentrated in the largest cities 211 and was aimed primarily at
plaintiffs, 2 12 particularly those asserting civil rights claims. 2 13 Typically sanc-

tions were sought after the grant of a motion terminating the litigation21 4 and

were imposed only for misconduct that could be characterized as frivolous, egre-

gious, irresponsible, unreasonable, or meritless.2 1 5 Findings of willfulness or

of sanctions, did tend to
bad faith, though not a prerequisite to the imposition
2 16
increase the severity of the sanction imposed.
These developments do not establish, of course, that rule 11 will accomplish
all of its goals or will not have undesirable side effects. Thus, critics of the rule,

who originally expressed the fear that it might chill legal enthusiasm and crea206. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes (1983).
207. Levin & Sobel, Achieving Balance in the Developing Law of Sanctions, 36 CATH. L. REV.
587, 590-91 (1987) (asserting that the new rule has worked well and has sanctioned and, it is hoped,
deterred the filing of frivolous suits).
208. The only announced limitation-and arguably a correct one-is the refusal of some courts
to make the certification under rule 11 a continuing one. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836
F.2d 866, 874-75 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274-75 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987).
209. See supra notes 206-07.
210. A LEXIS search on March 5, 1987, generated more than 700 district court cases containing
a discussion of rule 11 sanctions. Levin & Sobel, supra note 207, at 592 n.24. At the rate such cases
are being decided, more than a thousand such decisions were likely by the middle of 1988.
211. Nelken, supra note 61, at 1326-27.
212. Id. at 1327-28.
213. Id. at 1327. Securities cases, another type of disfavored action, also were disproportionately
represented. Id.
214. Id. (in one third of all rule I1 cases sanctions were sought in connection with, and ordinarily after the grant of, motions to dismiss or for summary judgment).
215. Most of the decisions require an extreme element of meritlessness, carelessness, or bad faith
as a prerequisite to a finding of violation. E.g., Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor and City Council, 775
F.2d 177, 181 (7th Cir. 1985) (claim not "utter[ly] meritless[]"); Eastway Const. Corp. v. City of
New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) (sanctions appropriate when it is "patently clear" that a
claim has absolutely no chance of success); Lussy v. Haswell, 618 F. Supp. 1360, 1361 (D. Mont.
1985) (totally unrecognized claim based on legal theory that justice was being "hoarded"); Kendrick
v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (claim based on allegations known to be false
or unprovable); Hecht v. United States, 609 F. Supp. 264, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (suit clearly barred
by statute); McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 602 F. Supp. 1412, 1418 (D.D.C. 1985) (multiple meritless
actions and frivolous postjudgment motions); Young v. Internal Revenue Serv., 596 F. Supp. 141,
151-52 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (one of many frivolous actions challenging the validity of the income tax);
Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 590 F. Supp. 852, 857 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (action clearly barred by
statute), rev'd, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986). Levin and Sobel suggest that when trial judges have
sanctioned nonegregious conduct, appellate courts have tended to reverse. Levin & Sobel, supra note
207, at 591 & n.17 (citing Olivieri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986)), cert. denied,
480 U.S. 918 (1987); Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1986)).
216. Nelken, supra note 61, at 1331.
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tivity and restrict access to the courts, 2 17 now point to the statistical evidence of
disproportionate impact upon civil rights plaintiffs as some proof that these fears
have been realized. 2 18 The evidence, however, is very slim. Even before the
adoption of rule 11, civil rights cases were regarded as a major source of meritless litigation and had already become the subject of increased interception efforts. 2 1 9 Thus, it was perhaps inevitable that plaintiffs asserting these and other
disfavored or troubling claims would initially be the most visible targets of the
new rule. 220 The notes to amended rule 11,221 and now the vast majority of
cases, go out of their way, however, to emphasize that legal enthusiasm and
creativity are not proper targets and that reasonable lawyering, undiscounted by
222
the wisdom of hindsight, is not to be sanctioned.
Inevitably some judges will exceed these limits, appeals will become necessary and sometimes fail, injustice will be done, legitimate advocacy will be chilled, and access to the courts will be denied. The question is not whether such
223
evils will occur but how often. Thus far their incidence has been very small,
small enough to make them, for the time being, an acceptable cost of eliminating
other, greater evils from the system. This is not to deny that access to the courts
and the right to advance factual and legal contentions are fundamental goals of
our legal system. Without some controls on these goals, however, the system
almost failed. Rule 11 established such controls and will not fail simply because
they are succeeding. The question is whether they will succeed too wellwhether they are greater than necessary to achieve systemic efficiency and individual accountability. 224 Thus far the evidence suggests that the controls are
217. E.g., Nelken, supra note 61, at 1338-43; Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards
for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630, 634-44 (1987); Note, Reasonable Inquiry Under Rule
11-Is the Stop, Look, and Investigate Requirement a Litigant's Roadblock?, 18 IND. L. REV. 751,

773 (1985).
218. Nelken, supra note 61, at 1340.
219. See supra note 106.
220. Not surprisingly, cases asserting securities fraud, antitrust violations, and other conspiracies, which have also been targeted for more careful scrutiny at the pleading level, see text accompanying notes 106-07, have apparently also generated their share of rule 11 motions. See, e.g., WSB
Elec. Co. Inc. v. Rank and File Comm., 103 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (civil rights and common
law conspiracy, RICO); Goldman v. Belden, 580 F. Supp. 1373, 1381-82 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (securities fraud); see also Nelken, supra note 61, at 1327 (securities fraud cases consititute disproportionate
percentage of rule 11 cases in survey).
221. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes (1983) (rule not intended to chill an attorney's
enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories); accord Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City
of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 574-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
222. See supra note 217.
223. That is my personal reading of the cases. Others read them similarly. Levin & Sobel, supra
note 207, at 591 (courts are taking a balanced approach to rule 11); Schwarzer, Commentary, Rule
11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1017 (1988) (no anecdotal evidence that attorney conduct
has been chilled by rule 11).
224. One study has wisely pointed out that rule 11 by itself cannot possibly achieve a radical
reduction in the filing of new actions or in the incidence of discovery abuse. Levin & Sobel, supra
note 207, at 591-92. To the extent sanctions can punish and discourage the worst offenses, however,
they will do some good and eliminate some of the system's worst irritants. Once again the question
is whether this gain is worth the cost of administering rule 11, as well as the negative pressure it
imposes on attorneys. One suspects that if European attorneys and litigants can survive the pressure
of full-cost shifting rules, see supra note 191, their American counterparts can survive this comparatively modest imposition on their access to courts.
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neither too successful nor too formidable.
Although rule ll's critics frequently ask whether it goes too far, almost

none ask whether it goes far enough, that is, whether in combination with a
revitalized interception system, it can eliminate enough of the dross currently
clogging the civil litigation system. I believe that it cannot and that eventually

we will have to address the question of the next procedural reform.225 The present system will fall short, in my opinion, because of several incontrovertible real-

ities. First, many factually and legally doubtful claims and defenses are not so
obviously without merit that they can be intercepted before trial or, after failing

at trial, will result in sanctions under rule 11, as it is presently, and probably
correctly, interpreted. 226 Second, the tactical settlement value of such claims
will continue to commend their assertion and prosecution, despite substantial
doubts as to their merits or provability. As a result of these two realities, a spate
of doubtful claims probably will continue to clog the courts and undermine the
efficiency and fairness of the civil justice system. That is not a pleasing outcome

to today's reform efforts, but its inevitability is, I believe, logically demonstrable.
Rule 11 sanctions have been imposed primarily upon cases or claims so

lacking in merit that they were quickly dismissed. 227 Because such dross lacks
225. Substantive reform must also be considered. Professor Miller has suggested that one source
of the current litigation explosion in the federal courts is the growth in federal substantive rights.
Miller, supra note 4, at 5-8. He also notes that the federal courts and the executive branch are
currently in the process of curtailing or limiting some of these rights. Id. at 7. I have already
alluded to the recent reduction in the reach of the antitrust laws, see supra note 52, which will
probably do more to unburden the federal courts than any procedural reform. At the state level
statutory efforts to curtail the reach of the tort laws are widespread. Common-law courts also have a
role to play. For the past few decades courts would almost never conclude that on the law and the
facts alleged or proved, no reasoning person could find that the act was negligent or the product was
defective. See, e.g., Friedman v. General Motors Corp., 43 Ohio St. 2d 209, 331 N.E.2d 702, 707
(1975) (reversing the grant of a directed verdict on weak evidence of a defective product). Hence,
almost any allegation of negligence or defective product would create a jury question. As the substantive law contracts, the interception of the worst of these cases will again become possible and
their tactical settlement value will correspondingly be diminished.
226. For example, a tort claim that approaches the limits of what constitutes unreasonable conduct under all the circumstances, or that is based on interested testimony and stretches the limits of
the factfinder's credulity, may nevertheless still present a question for the jury. If so, should or could
rule 11 sanctions be imposed on a plaintiff if the jury finds for the defendant on such a claim or, after
a verdict for the plaintiff, the court grants a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new
trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence? I know of no cases addressing these issues specifically. I doubt that many courts today would consider imposing sanctions in
these situations, unless evidence had been concealed or some other improper act had occurred. If so,
then rule I1 will rarely be applied to cases that fail on the merits at trial and will find its principal
application to claims that are intercepted before trial. Moreover, some types of pretrial interception
are probably not appropriate situations for sanctions. For example, a claimant who suffers summary
judgment probably will escape sanctions if the claim involved unequal access to the evidence and was
based at least on reasonable suspicion that discovery failed to substantiate. E.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1279 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987); Kamen v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011-12 (2d Cir. 1986) (both cases suggesting that in unequal access
situations, plaintiff could appropriately file a claim without a prima facie case in hand and obtain
discovery before confronting a challenge on the merits; both opinions implying that plaintiff would
not be sanctioned if the discovery did not succeed). Of course if a plaintiff stoutly resists a motion
for summary judgment after discovery has failed to uncover the missing proof, the plaintiff perhaps
should be required to pay the moving party's costs and fees arising out of this successful motion.
227. Nelken, supra note 61, at 1327 (one-third of all rule 11 sanctions followed successful motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief or for summary judgment; many other cases
involved other rule 12 grounds or motions to remand removed cases to state court).
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the staying power to run up the bill or accumulate settlement value, its elimination may not substantially unburden the system. 228 Arguably the system is
more often and more heavily burdened by those doubtful claims and defenses
that may fail at trial but possess enough factual and legal validity to avoid early
interception and rule 11 sanctions and to accumulate reasonable settlement
value. 229 Until recently many private antitrust actions arguably fell within this
description. 230 These were cases that ultimately failed or were settled for their
nuisance value; many were based on suspicion or surmise rather than evidence in
hand, or upon very doubtful legal theories. Consequently, the prospects for success of many such actions were more dependent on settlement value, which included the high cost of discovery and a potential trial, than on their ultimate
merits. Although the number of such actions has doubtlessly declined in recent
years because of changes in the substantive law, many are still filed, fail, and
now encounter requests for rule 11 sanctions. In Norton Tire Co. v. Tire Kingdom Co.,231 for example, plaintiff, a tire retailer in Broward County, Florida,
charged defendant, a major seller of tires in nearby Palm Beach County, with an
attempt to monopolize retail tire sales in Broward County, in which defendant
had a small but growing operation. 232 Ultimately this charge was dismissed
with prejudice and defendant moved for sanctions under rule 11. One of the
elements of the offense of attempted monopoly is that defendant's conduct, if
unchecked, shows a dangerous probability of successfully achieving monopoly. 233 But monopoly requires more than half and probably at least a two-thirds
228. Of course it does unburden the defendants, who recover their attorney fees and other costs
and may be spared such harassment in the future.
229. See supra note 226 for a more detailed consideration of such cases.
230. Private antitrust cases, most seeking the remedy of treble damages, constituted the bulk of
all antitrust litigation. The number of private cases grew dramatically after World War II and as
"big cases" obviously consumed a large share of judicial and litigative resources. See K. ELZINGA &
W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMIcS 12 & n.12 (1976).
Scholars disagree as to whether the net contribution of the private antitrust action has been positive.
See Pitofsky & Salop, Forewordto PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION xiii (L. White ed. 1988) (noting that some scholars conclude the private antitrust action "does not appear to be excessively expensive, to consume a large amount of judicial resources, or to result in inappropriate recoveries,"
whereas other scholars think that "the present system unduly encourages frivolous suits and deters
efficient behavior"). Nevertheless, one scholar points out that a majority of private actions have little
to do with forwarding the basic economic goals of antitrust enforcement and too many are competitor actions, where the danger of misuse of antitrust litigation for anticompetitive purposes is greatest.
Millstein, The Georgetown Study of Private Antitrust Litigation: Some Policy Implications, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION, supra, at 399-400. Another scholar concludes that "a substantial
number of private antitrust cases are ill-founded, brought in hopes of obtaining substantial cash
settlements from defendants seeking to avoid the costs of litigation and the risk that bits of evidence
...will lead to adverse jury verdicts." Turner, PrivateAntitrust Enforcement: Policy Recommendations, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION, supra, at 407.

231. 116 F.R.D. 236 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (reversing on reconsideration an earlier opinion at 108
F.R.D. 371 (S.D. Fla. 1985) awarding rule 11 sanctions), aff'd, 858 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1988).
232. Plaintiff had almost 10% of the Broward County market, whereas defendant had just less
than 5%. Id. at 237. According to a newspaper article, defendant had more than 20% of the Palm
Beach County market, which defendant was also accused of attempting to monopolize. Id. But
because there was no allegation that plaintiff also did business in Palm Beach County, arguably
plaintiff lacked standing to challenge defendant's activities in that market. In any event 20% of that
market probably was still too small to support a claim of attempted monopoly. See infra note 234.
233. Norton, 116 F.R.D. at 237.
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share of the market, 234 particularly one as fiercely competitive and easy to enter
as the retail tire market. 2 35 The chances that defendant, which had only a five
percent share of the Broward market-when plaintiff had ten percent-could
obtain even half of this market, let alone two-thirds, were so slim that they approached impossibility. Nevertheless, the trial judge ultimately denied sanctions. Plaintiff had argued that it was relying on a minority rule of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which in attempted monopoly
cases will accept proof of bad intent in lieu of proof of a substantial market
share.2 36 This rule, which most other circuits including the fifth and eleventh
have rejected, 237 is widely regarded as bad law and economics. 238 With antitrust law in decline today, the rule would have had little chance of acceptance in
any other circuit. Nevertheless, the trial judge was persuaded that plaintiff had
been prepared to argue in good faith for the modification or reversal of existing
239
law and accordingly denied defendant's request for sanctions.
Perhaps the decision is correct under present rule 11.240 Nevertheless, the
234. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (asserting it is
doubtful that 60 or 64% of a market is enough to constitute monopoly power and that 33% clearly
is insufficient); P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 3 ANTITRUST LAW

1 835, at 350 (1978)

(suggesting that

claims of attempted monopoly involving market shares less than 30% should presumptively be
rejected).
235. Norton, 116 F.R.D. at 237.
236. The Ninth Circuit's minority position originated with the decision in Lessig v. Tidewater
Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964), in which the court opined
that when "the charge is attempt (or conspiracy) to monopolize, rather than monopolization, the
relevant market is 'not in issue.'" Id. at 474. More recent decisions of the Ninth Circuit, which
were relied on by the district court in Norton, 116 F.R.D. at 238, and which amount to a partial
retreat from Lessig, now assert that a dangerous probability of success may be inferred from intent to
monopolize, which in turn may be inferred from the nature of the anticompetitive conduct. The
intent or anticompetitive acts from which the intent is inferred must be of a kind that would not be
undertaken by a firm without substantial market power or its prospect. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS 297 (3d ed. 1981).

237. Norton, 116 F.R.D. at 374. Opinions of the Fifth Circuit were regarded as binding on
district courts in the Eleventh Circuit, which was carved out of the Fifth. In any event, the Eleventh
Circuit eventually followed the Fifth in apparently rejecting the minority position of the Ninth Circuit on the issue in question. Id.
238. P. AREEDA &D. TURNER, supra note 236, 1 835a, at 346. The principal reason for opposing the minority rule is that it can transform almost any business tort that poses no threat to overall
competition in the market into a federal antitrust offense with its attendant criminal and treble
damage sanctions. Areeda and Turner do support a narrow exception to the rule requiring proof of
market power in cases of attempted monopoly, namely, an exception for outright exclusionary conduct like predatory pricing that lacks redeeming social virtue and that would ordinarily not be undertaken by a firm without substantial market power or the prospect of obtaining it. Id. q 834, at
350-55. This exception is somewhat similar to the Ninth Circuit's present version of its minority
rule. See supra note 236. There is nothing in the Norton opinions, however, suggesting that plaintiff
ever alleged conduct by defendant-such as predatory pricing-that would invoke this narrow exception. Indeed, the Norton opinions are silent as to what defendant allegedly may have done to
invoke the Ninth Circuit's minority rule. Moreover, given the ease of entry into the retail tire market and the giant companies like Sears that compete therein, the attainment and retention of a monopoly in any such market through predatory pricing is so unlikely as to cast serious doubts on the
applicability of the exception to this case. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 592 (1986) (predatory pricing cannot succeed unless the wrongdoers can prevent new
entry and escape antitrust liability). Thus, even if this minority rule is, at least in part, intellectually
defensible, there was no demonstrated factual basis for invoking it in Norton.
239. Norton, 116 F.R.D. at 239-40.
240. That would obviously depend on whether the plaintiff in Norton ever seriously alleged the
kind of predatory conduct contemplated by the minority rule. See supra note 238.
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litigation probably imposed a heavy burden on both defendant and the court
and, like too many other private antitrust claims, may have been motivated principally by an anticompetitive desire to slow defendant's aggressive expansion
into plaintiff's market. Moreover, from the start the claim had virtually no
chance of success, particularly in today's free market climate. Why then did
plaintiff enjoy a free run at defendant? It is no answer to suggest that if defendant could have shown plaintiff's anticompetitive, improper purpose, defendant
could have succeeded anyway. Because direct evidence of such a purpose ordinarily is unavailable, its existence must be inferred from the meritlessness of the
claim itself. Consequently, improper purpose will be used much more often to
24 1
underscore a rule 11 violation than to establish it.
The federal reports are filled with questionable minority antitrust case law
on which othr litigants could similarly rely in "good faith. ' '242 Moreover, like
antitrust cases, civil rights cases, public figure defamation actions, and shareholder derivative suits often involve state-of-mind issues or other situations involving unequal access to the evidence. Persons asserting these protracted
claims, therefore, have a built-in excuse under rule 11 for undertaking complex
litigation despite its low success rate and the lack of prima facie evidence in
hand. Thus, an expensive but unsuccessful attempt through discovery, or examination of hostile witnesses as on cross-examination at trial, to obtain evidence
that defendants had acted maliciously or conspired with each other would probably not be sanctioned if the plaintiff at least had had good reason to be suspicious. 2 4 3 These types of cases arguably demonstrate that the system is as
vulnerable to those who gamble at litigation as it is to those who intentionally or
negligently employ it for abuse, and that rule 11 will probably fall short if it
cannot also deter the former.
What then can be done to discourage those who gamble at litigation by
asserting expensive, burdensome claims and defenses that apparently have little
chance to succeed but that possess substantial settlement value and sufficient
color to escape pretrial interception and rule 11 sanctions? The most likely answer, which is apparently still an unacceptable one in America, is greater use of
attorney fee shifting. As a half-way step, rule 11 could provide that expenses,
including attorneys' fees, would be awarded to the prevailing party, unless the
court finds that the losing party's position "was substantially justified or that
special circumstances make an award unjust."' 2 4 4 Such a provision would not,
241. See supra note 216.
242. For example, some courts have found the requisite power in attempted monopoly cases by
excluding brands in competition with the defendant's product from the market definition. E.g., Mt.
Lebanon Motors, Inc., v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453, 460 (W.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd on other
grounds, 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969) (defining product market as Dodge cars). Although acceptance by other courts of this generally invalid approach is most unlikely today, would reliance
thereon in litigation similarly be in "good faith"?
243. See supra note 226.
244. This language is borrowed from the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 504(a)(1)
(West Supp. 1988), which imposes one way cost and attorney fee shifting upon the United States in
favor of a party prevailing in adversary adjudication against a government agency. For general use
in civil litigation, the provision would of course have to provide, as the text suggests, for two way
cost and attorney fee shifting.
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by definition, penalize bona fide litigation, but it could certainly chill it, particu-

larly for risk-averse plaintiffs. 24 5 Moreover, because of the inevitable breadth

and vagueness of such a half-way standard, trial courts applying it would enjoy a

large amount of discretionary power, or its functional equivalent. 2 46 Such augmented trial-level disciplinary power would make even more uneasy those who

represent unpopular causes and litigants and who are already understandably
247
troubled by rule 11.

These concerns over judicial discretion and bias in the award of attorneys'
fees could of course be eliminated by adoption of the English or continental rule,
under which such fees are generally awarded to the prevailing party. 248 This
rule, however, is regarded by some as offensive to democratic notions of open
access to courts, 24 9 particularly because it apparently would have much greater

impact on ordinary, risk-averse persons than on those with assets and familiarity

with the litigation process. 250 In any event, there clearly is insufficient support

today for the adoption of any such cost-shifting system. Thus, a less far reaching proposal in 1983 to add attorneys' fees to cost awards under rule 68251 was

stoutly resisted and resoundingly defeated. 252

Some years from today it should become generally apparent that additional
procedural change is necessary to unburden the system from the crush of doubtful or risky litigation. The adoption of general attorney fee shifting will proba245. See Rowe, Predictingthe Effects of Attorney FeeShifting, LAW & CONTEMP. PROas., Winter 1984, at 139, 153 (examining the possible effects upon litigants of various attorney fee shifting
schemes).
246. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
247. As mentioned above, civil rights plaintiffs and their attorneys have already received more
than their share of rule 11 sanctions. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text. Some of the
attorneys have told me privately that they are already fearful of and troubled by rule 11, particularly
when they appear before recently appointed, very conservative federal trial judges. Therefore, an
even broader discretionary standard, such as the one suggested, would presumably be unacceptable
to them. Needless to say, the discretion vested by the Equal Access to Justice Act, see supra note
244, is not similarly troubling because it involves only one way cost and attorney fee shifting upon
the Unites States, which has in effect chosen to impose this sanction upon itself.
248. See generally Pfennigstorf, The European Experience With Attorney Fee Shifting, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 37 (describing the English and the various continental European
systems).
249. See generally Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967)
(asserting that a traditional justification of the American rule is that "the poor might be unjustly
discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the
fees of their opponent's counsel"); Schwartz, Foreword, Symposium on Attorney Fee Shifting, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 1, 2 (the American rule does not discourage those with limited
financial means from using the judicial system).
250. Rowe, supra note 245, at 142, 153 (assessing the impact of attorney fee shifting upon wellfinanced organizations that litigate regularly and upon individuals of modest means).
251. This proposal would have enabled parties to recover attorneys' fees in cases involving settlement offers rejected and not bettered in the final judgment. PreliminaryDraft ofProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,98 F.R.D. 339, 361-67 (1983). The effects of such a
provision are studied in Rowe, supra note 245, at 164-70.
252. See generally Note, The Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68:
Toughening the Sanctions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 237, 251 (1984) (criticizing the proposed addition of
attorney fee shifting to rule 68 and asserting it might abridge substantive rights in violation of the
Rules Enabling Act); Note, Current Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 68 And Official Proposed
Changes: Important Impacts On Attorney's Fee Awards, 31 S.D.L. REV. 209 (1985) (analyzing case
law under and proposed changes in rule 68).
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bly then be considered carefully, since the only other alternative, the elimination
of the civil jury, will probably still be even less palatable. 25 3 By then we should
and
at least have more understanding of the overall effects of cost shifting
254
greater ability to choose wisely among the variations and alternatives.
V.

CONCLUSION'

Extreme approaches to the interception and discouragement of doubtful litigation apparently are hazardous to the success of a civil procedure system. The
Field Code failed because of its anticlaimant bias; the Federal Rules have almost
failed because of their proclaimant bias. In both cases the litigation bar recognized and ruthlessly exploited these biases, and the courts, which should have
reacted to the emerging difficulties, instead too often ignored or exacerbated
them. In the past decade the federal system has begun a correction process
designed to eliminate its extreme proclaimant bias. Whether it will overcorrect
and again acquire an anticlaimant bias remains to be seen. Meanwhile, as past
doctrinal limitations are removed or softened, increasingly large amounts of undefined discretionary power will accrue to trial judges, many of whom could
individually begin to overcorrrect.
A contemporary survey of the principal pretrial interception/discouragement mechanisms-pleading, summary judgment, and rule 11 sanctions-demonstrates that the federal system is now moving aggressively to deal with the
present procedural crisis and the system's perceived deficiencies. The most questionable development has been the selective reintroduction of fact pleading by
the federal courts in defiance of, or at least with little regard to, the text and
history of the Federal Rules, the affected substantive statutory rights, and the
failure of fact pleading under the Field Code. Not surprisingly, the federal
courts have not done much better with fact pleading than their code counterparts. With rule 11 sanctions and a reinvigorated motion for summary judgment available to them, they should seriously reconsider their present fondness
for fact pleading.
A more aggressive use of the motion for summary judgment is now an accepted feature of the federal procedural landscape. The appellate courts have
253. Great Britain has already undertaken all three major steps, abolition of the jury in most
civil cases, general attorney fee shifting, and attorney fee shifting pursuant to an offer of settlement

or, as the process is described there, payment into court. See Rowe, supra note 245, at 165. Apparently its civil justice system does not now suffer from near breakdown or gridlock. The British system with its more carefully selected bench and litigating bar is of course quite different from
America's system and the favorable results it achieves are not necessarily transferable here.
254. Many state and federal statutes now provide for the one-way shifting of attorneys' fees in
favor of prevailing plaintiffs, particularly in litigation against the government. See Fein, Citizen Suit
Attorney Fee Shifting Awards: A CriticalExamination of Government-"Subsidized" Litigation, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 210; Percival & Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in
Public Interest Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Winter 1984, at 233. Thus, major change will
require the possibility of awards against claimants in favor of prevailing defendants beyond what is
provided by rule 11 today. (Presumably, attorney fee awards pursuant to offers of judgment or
settlement under FED. R. Civ. P. 68 would also be considered.) Of course, a general two-way attorney fee shifting scheme modeled along European lines would make unnecessary all current proclaimant one-way fee shifting statutes.
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failed, however, to define the new approach with any precision. Instead, they
have simply provided the trial judges with a new, countervailing set of cliches
favorable to the grant of the motion and encouraged them to go forth and do
justice. Under such circumstances the resulting "justice" could be idiosyncratic
or inhospitable to particular disfavored causes of action. Although appellate
courts are available to correct any resulting injustice, they (or those who would
revise rule 56) must eventually articulate the requirements of the motion with
greater precision.
In five short years rule 11 sanctions have become an important and controversial aspect of federal practice. These sanctions provide in effect for attorney
fee shifting against those who assert claims and defenses lacking any basis in law
or fact. Although a few trial judges may have attempted to go farther than this,
their attempts have generally failed to survive appellate scrutiny. Nevertheless,
this new sanctioning process must to some small degree dampen legal creativity
and limit access to the courts. Such undesirable effects are, I believe, the small
but necessary price we must pay to impose a modicum of responsibility on those
who litigate and who, in the absence of such sanctions and other effective interception/discouragement devices, almost brought the civil justice system to its
knees. Critics point to empirical evidence showing that such sanctions fall principally upon plaintiffs, particularly those who assert civil rights claims and other
currently disfavored causes of action, and argue that rule 11 is simply one more
weapon in today's efforts to stifle claimants. Although the facts are true, the
criticism is premature. It is hardly surprising that those who principally caused
the present crisis and against whom countermeasures were specifically instituted
were initially the most visible and favored targets of these countermeasures.
That does not prove-and for the moment there is no other evidence-that these
groups have been unfairly targeted or that any heightened judicial scrutiny they
may receive today will not eventually dissipate.
Arguably the real flaw in this flirtation with attorney cost shifting is that it
is too limited-that it will have virtually no impact upon complex or protracted
litigation involving claims that are not baseless but that are very doubtful or
hard to prove. These claims, which may survive pretrial interception and possess enough tactical value to justify their otherwise questionable assertion, are
largely immune to rule 11 today. Until their assertion is somehow discouraged
or taxed and the existing invitation to gamble at litigation is either conditioned
or withdrawn, the civil justice system cannot be substantially unburdened. The
obvious solution is greater use of attorney fee shifting, which, however, appears
to be politically unacceptable today.

